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FUTURE CLAIMANTS AND THE QUEST FOR GLOBAL
PEACE
Rhonda Wasserman*
ABSTRACT
In the mass tort context, the defendant typically seeks to resolve all of the
claims against it in one fell swoop. But the defendant’s interest in global peace
is often unattainable in cases involving future claimants—those individuals
who have already been exposed to a toxic material or defective product, but
whose injuries have not yet manifested sufficiently to support a claim or
motivate them to pursue it. The class action vehicle cannot be used because it
is impossible to provide reasonable notice and adequate representation to
future claimants. Likewise, nonclass aggregate settlements cannot be deployed
because future claimants will not have contacted attorneys whose participation
is critical to those alternative methods of dispute resolution.
In lieu of class actions and nonclass aggregate settlements, this Article
proposes a hybrid public–private claims resolution process designed to
provide many of the benefits of global peace, while preserving the
constitutional rights of future claimants and ensuring them fair compensation
as their injuries manifest. Under this proposal, defendants would secure
judicial approval of a fair and reasonable class action settlement of the
current claims and then, through an extrajudicial process, make fair offers on
comparable terms to future claimants as their claims mature, adjusted to take
into account the time value of money and intervening changes in legal doctrine
and medical advances. Since the class action settlement would not purport to
bind the future claimants, their constitutional rights would be protected. And
even though the future claimants would not be bound by the class action
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judgment nor obligated to accept the fair offers on comparable terms, they
would have an incentive to accept them, rather than sue in tort, because they
would be assured fair compensation without incurring the costs of litigation.
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INTRODUCTION
In the mass tort context—in which many individuals are injured as a result
of the defendant’s tortious conduct—the defendant typically seeks to resolve
all of the claims against it in one fell swoop.1 The defendant’s interest in global
peace—a once-and-for-all resolution of all of the claims against it—is both
intense and understandable.2 But whether global peace is attainable depends, in
large part, on the nature of the mass tort involved.
As Professor Geoffrey Hazard famously quipped, “there are mass torts, and
there are mass torts.”3 Some mass torts, like airplane accidents, occur at one
moment in time; in one place; affect a relatively small, discrete, and
identifiable group of individuals; and subject them all to one sad fate.4
Although doubts were expressed early on about the suitability of the class
action device to handle mass torts,5 judges have frequently employed class
actions to resolve single-incident mass torts of this type.6
Other mass torts, such as toxic torts involving exposure to asbestos,
environmental contaminants, or drugs with undisclosed side effects, cause
harm over extended periods of time to potentially enormous groups of often
unidentifiable individuals in differing degrees.7 In these cases, class
certification may be stymied by the multiplicity of individual issues and

1

WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH act 4, sc. 3 (“He has no children. All my pretty ones? Did you say
all? what all? oh hell-kite! all? What, all my pretty chickens, and their dam, At one fell swoop?”).
2 See infra Part I.
3 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Futures Problem, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1901, 1901 (2000).
4 Id. at 1901–02.
5 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee’s note (1966) (“A ‘mass accident’ resulting in
injuries to numerous persons is ordinarily not appropriate for a class action because of the likelihood that
significant questions, not only of damages but of liability and defenses of liability, would be present, affecting
the individuals in different ways.”).
6 7AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1783, at 327–28 (3d ed. 2005) (stating that “[t]he argument for class-action treatment is
particularly strong in cases arising out of mass disasters such as an airplane or train crash in which there is
little chance of individual defenses being presented” and citing opinions that certified class actions in mass
accident cases); see also, e.g., Mehl v. Canadian Pac. Ry., 227 F.R.D. 505 (D.N.D. 2005) (certifying a class
action seeking money damages for both personal injury and property damage arising out of a train derailment
that resulted in the release of anhydrous ammonia); Sala v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 120 F.R.D. 494, 500
(E.D. Pa. 1988) (certifying a class action on behalf of all passengers who suffered injuries in a train
derailment); cf. Causey v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 392, 397, 399 (E.D. Va. 1975) (expressing
the view that “under some circumstances mass accident litigation may and probably ought to be maintained as
a class action” but declining to certify a class in the case before it because, inter alia, many of the plane crash
victims were not American citizens and “the conflict of law questions would be extremely complex”).
7 Hazard, supra note 3, at 1902.
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complex choice-of-law questions.8 Even more daunting is the prospect of
future claimants—those individuals who have already been exposed to a toxic
material or defective product but whose injuries have not yet manifested
sufficiently to support a claim or motivate them to pursue it.9
The question is whether global peace is attainable when mass torts affect
not only multitudes of current claimants but also future claimants whose
injuries have not yet manifested. This Article maintains that the class action
vehicle cannot be used to resolve certain future claims because it will be
impossible to provide reasonable notice or adequate representation to those
future claimants who are not yet aware of their exposure or whose claims are
contingent upon a future event.10 Nor can nonclass aggregate settlements be
used to secure global peace. Unknowing and contingent future claimants will
not have retained counsel, whose participation is necessary to a “Vioxx-type”
all-or-nothing settlement,11 and they cannot grant the advanced consent
contemplated by the Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation proposed by
the American Law Institute (ALI).12
If neither class actions nor nonclass aggregate settlements can be used to
secure the global peace sought by defendants, the question remaining is
whether an alternate mechanism can be crafted to achieve most (if not all) of

8

7AA WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 6, § 1782, at 320 (“[T]o the extent that different injuries
are alleged to have occurred to different class members over different periods of time, it is difficult to show
that common issues predominate and that a class action would be superior.”); see also, e.g., 7B id. § 1805, at
400 (“[A]ttempts to invoke Rule 23 for mass products-liability claims have met with major difficulties.”).
9 See, e.g., Roger C. Cramton, Individualized Justice, Mass Torts, and “Settlement Class Actions”: An
Introduction, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 811, 811 n.1 (1995) (“‘Future claimants’ includes two groups of people—
those who have a matured claim but have not yet asserted it, and those who may have been exposed to a
substance but have not yet suffered the harm that gives rise to a tort cause of action.”); Hazard, supra note 3, at
1903 (stating that a future claim “is one where a claimant cannot presently prove a causal connection between
an injury and a supposed source of injury, but nevertheless suspects or fears that he or she is suffering injury
that has its origin in the suspect source”); Diane P. Wood, Commentary on The Futures Problem, by Geoffrey
C. Hazard, Jr., 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1933, 1933 (2000) (“[A] futures claim is one based on an event that has
already occurred (such as exposure to a toxic material), but whose consequences will not become clear enough
to support a legal claim until some time after the statute of limitations (measured from the date of the event)
has expired.”); see also infra Part II for a discussion of the complexities inherent in the definition.
10 See infra notes 39–44 and accompanying text (describing unknowing, exposure-unaware and
contingent future claimants); see also infra Part III (analyzing the difficulties in providing reasonable notice
and adequate representation to unknowing, exposure-unaware and contingent future claimants).
11 See infra Part IV.A.
12 See AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.16(b) (2010) [hereinafter
ALI PRINCIPLES] (proposing a modification to the aggregate settlement rule found in MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 1.8(g), quoted infra note 167); see also infra Part IV.B.

WASSERMAN GALLEYSPROOFS2

2014]

12/23/2014 12:14 PM

FUTURE CLAIMANTS AND THE QUEST FOR GLOBAL PEACE

535

the defendant’s goals while preserving the constitutional rights of future
claimants and ensuring them compensation for their injuries as they manifest.
This Article proposes a hybrid public–private claims resolution process
designed to achieve these objectives.13 Under this proposal, defendants would
secure judicial approval of a fair and reasonable class action settlement of the
current claims and then, through an extrajudicial process, make fair offers on
comparable terms to future claimants as their claims mature, adjusted to take
into account the time value of money, intervening changes in legal doctrine,
and medical and technological advances. Since the judicially-approved class
action settlement would not purport to bind the future claimants, their
constitutional rights would be protected. And even though the future claimants
would not be bound by the class action judgment nor obligated to accept the
fair offers on comparable terms, the future claimants would have an incentive
to accept them, rather than sue in tort, because they would be assured fair
compensation without incurring the costs of litigation.
Part I examines the goal of global peace, unpacking the defendant’s
multiple objectives and identifying ways in which the claimants and the courts
may also benefit from a once-and-for-all resolution of the claims. Part II
develops the concept of the future claimant, noting ways in which the category
is heterogeneous, fluid, and porous. It observes the movement of individuals
between the categories of current and future claimants and the overlap between
future claimants and the public at large. Part III questions whether a class
action can be deployed to achieve global peace, concluding that certain
unknowing and contingent future claimants cannot be notified or adequately
represented. Part IV considers but rejects the possibility that innovative
nonclass aggregate settlement options, such as “Vioxx-type” all-or-nothing
settlements or the advanced consents proposed by the ALI Aggregate
Litigation project, can be used to secure a global peace that would bind
unknowing future claimants. Finally, Part V outlines the proposal for a hybrid
public–private claims resolution process, which would employ a class action to
resolve the claims of the current claimants followed by an extrajudicial process
offering future claimants fair offers on comparable terms, adjusted to account
for changes in law and science and the time value of money. If structured and
administered properly, such a process could yield something approximating a
global peace while preserving the future claimants’ constitutional rights and
ensuring them fair compensation.
13

See infra Part V.
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I. DEFENDANTS’ INSISTENCE ON GLOBAL PEACE
The starting assumption in negotiations,14 in judicial opinions,15 and in the
scholarly literature16 is that defendants negotiating settlements of mass torts
insist upon global peace; they do not want piecemeal settlements that fail to
resolve their total liability.17 Before considering why they are not likely to get
they want, let us first unpack their objective.
Defendants want global peace—a once-and-for-all resolution of all claims
(and potential claims) against them—for a variety of reasons. First, defendants
want to define and cap their total exposure. They want to know what it is going
to cost them to resolve all claims against them. To achieve this objective,
defendants need to eliminate or reduce the opportunity of individual claimants
to opt out of the settlement; otherwise, there is a risk that claimants with the
strongest claims will opt out and sue separately, while only those claimants
with the weakest claims will be bound by the settlement.18 In addition,
14

See, e.g., Juris v. Inamed Corp., 685 F.3d 1294, 1303 (11th Cir. 2012) (describing investors’
unwillingness “to finance any settlement that would not extinguish substantially all of the breast implant
litigation”); Adam Liptak, In Vioxx Settlement, Testing a Legal Ideal: A Lawyer’s Loyalty, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 22, 2008, at A12 (“Merck . . . wants to settle only if it can buy something like global peace.”).
15 See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 601 (1997) (noting that the defendant had
indicated in settlement discussions “that it would resist settlement of inventory cases absent ‘some kind of
protection for the future’” and noting that the defendant had told plaintiffs’ attorneys that “once [the
defendants] saw a rational way to deal with claims expected to be filed in the future, those defendants would
be prepared to address the settlement of pending cases” (citations omitted)); Ryan v. Dow Chem. Co. (In re
Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig.), 781 F. Supp. 902, 919–20 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (“Class action settlements
simply will not occur if the parties cannot set definitive limits on defendants’ liability.”).
16 See, e.g., Howard M. Erichson, The Trouble with All-or-Nothing Settlements, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 979,
979 (2010) (“Judges, lawyers, and academics largely accept the drive for comprehensive settlements as a
given . . . .”); Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, 96 CORNELL L. REV.
265, 265, 274 (2011) (stating that “[d]efendants demand closure” and noting that “[f]or the past twenty years,
mass tort defendants have searched doggedly for ways to obtain closure”); Susan P. Koniak, How Like a
Winter? The Plight of Absent Class Members Denied Adequate Representation, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1787, 1851–52 (2004) (“It is no secret and no sin that the aim of defendants in mass tort class actions, . . . is
‘global peace,’ an end to litigation on the matter.”); Thomas D. Morgan, Client Representation vs. Case
Administration: The ALI Looks at Legal Ethics Issues in Aggregate Settlements, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 734,
739 (2011) (“[T]he only way [a hypothetical defendant] is likely to settle at all is if that settlement will buy [it]
peace.”); Georgene M. Vairo, Georgine, the Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, and the Rhetoric of Mass Tort
Claims Resolution, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 79, 127 (1997) (“[D]efendants particularly want global peace as a
consequence of settling a mass tort.”); Wood, supra note 9, at 1935 (“[D]efendants want a way to bring closure
to their expected liability, and it is often the case that full closure cannot be achieved without some kind of
resolution . . . that resolves the claims of ‘futures’ as well as existing plaintiffs.”).
17 See, e.g., Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 16, at 271 (“[P]iecemeal settlements simply do not provide
sufficient peace to allow a defendant to put a dispute behind it.”).
18 Id. at 268; George Rutherglen, Better Late than Never: Notice and Opt Out at the Settlement Stage of
Class Actions, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 258, 278–79 (1996) (describing the risk that plaintiffs with “viable” claims
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defendants need the settlement to cap their liability even with respect to
prospective future claimants19—those who may have actionable claims in the
future arising from the same product or conduct that is the subject of the
settlement.20
Second, defendants not only want to define and cap their total exposure but
they actually want to reduce it by discouraging prospective claimants who have
not yet sued from initiating fresh litigation against them.21 Defendants may
fear that piecemeal settlements will attract additional claimants,22 so they want
to signal to potential follow-up claimants that the proffered global settlement is
their best, last, and only chance to receive compensation for the alleged wrong.
“If you build it, they will come,”23 and, defendants hope, if you shut it down,
they will go away.
Third, defendants want to reduce their total liability, not only by
discouraging the filing of new claims but also by reducing their transaction
costs.24 If, for example, there are a thousand claims against the defendant and it
will cost a thousand dollars to resolve each claim, the defendant wants to write
one check for a million dollars rather than litigate each of those thousand
claims to judgment and end up paying a second million dollars or more in
attorneys’ fees.25 The amount to be saved by reducing transaction costs can be
enormous. For example, a study of asbestos litigation conducted by the RAND
Institute for Civil Justice found that defendants spent approximately
will opt out and the defendant will be left “with a judgment that precludes only the smaller and weaker
claims”); Charles Silver & Lynn A. Baker, Mass Lawsuits and the Aggregate Settlement Rule, 32 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 733, 760 (1997) (discussing the risk of adverse selection).
19 See, e.g., Amchem, 521 U.S. at 600 (assessing a plan “designed to settle all pending and future asbestos
cases”); Juris, 685 F.3d at 1308 (describing a class action settlement that purported to bind “all persons . . .
who . . . may in the future have any unsatisfied claim . . . involving Inamed Breast Implants” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
20 See infra Part II (differentiating among different types of future claimants); see also, e.g., Amchem,
521 U.S. at 601 (noting that defendants communicated to lawyers representing individual plaintiffs “that once
[they] saw a rational way to deal with claims expected to be filed in the future, those defendants would be
prepared to address the settlement of pending cases”).
21 See, e.g., Silver & Baker, supra note 18, at 761 (describing the “financial exposure defendants face
from continued litigation by nonsettling plaintiffs”).
22 Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 18, at 271 (“[P]iecemeal settlements may draw more claimants into
the litigation, as prospective plaintiffs and attorneys smell blood in the water.”).
23 The actual quote, “If you build it, he will come,” is from the movie, FIELD OF DREAMS (Gordon
Company Productions 1989).
24 See, e.g., Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 16, at 271 (“When defendants settle mass litigation, they
prefer to settle wholesale. . . . [I]ndividual negotiations require greater resource expenditures . . . .”).
25 See, e.g., Silver & Baker, supra note 18, at 761 (“Defendants . . . prefer broader settlements to
narrower ones because broad settlements give them better returns on their sunk transaction costs . . . .”).
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$70 billion on asbestos litigation through 2002, of which approximately
thirty-one percent, or $21 billion, was spent on legal fees and expenses.26
Finally, when defendants talk about a need for closure or a need for global
peace, they are not just talking about an end to the obvious financial costs of
litigation. They want to avoid the distraction from core business functions that
litigation entails.27 They want to minimize the public relations disaster caused
not just by the litigation but by the underlying product failure.28 And they want
to reassure their investors.29
Defendants are not the only parties that benefit from global peace. The
judge clears her docket or a colleague’s docket and burnishes her reputation as
the tenacious judge who helped bring an end to the litigation morass,30 while
the judicial system is spared significant costs.31 Claimants, too, can benefit
from global settlements or global judgments. They can get their money sooner
if they settle rather than go to trial. They may get more money if the defendant
26

STEPHEN J. CARROLL, DEBORAH R. HENSLER, JENNIFER GROSS, ELIZABETH M. SLOSS, MATTHIAS
SCHONLAU, ALLAN ABRAHAMSE & J. SCOTT ASHWOOD, ASBESTOS LITIGATION 88, 92, 95 (2005), available at
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG162.pdf.
27 See, e.g., Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 143 F.R.D. 141, 147 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (noting that lawsuits “have
diverted the attention of many [defendants’] employees away from their usual jobs to deal with the litigation”);
Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 16, at 267 (noting that the Vioxx settlement, discussed infra Part IV.A,
“removed the distraction and expense of massive litigation and allowed the company to get back to business”).
28 See, e.g., Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 922 F. Supp. 1261, 1264 (S.D. Ohio 1996) (noting that even though
the defendant had been successful in getting some cases dismissed and in settling others, “the litigation and
attendant poor publicity was nevertheless taking its toll” and that “criticism of the [product] and of the
defendants in newspaper articles, television programs and even congressional hearings began to mount”).
29 See, e.g., Juris v. Inamed Corp., 685 F.3d 1294, 1303 (11th Cir. 2012) (“[I]nvestors were unwilling to
finance any settlement that would not extinguish substantially all of the breast implant litigation. They
considered elimination of the enormous costs and risks associated with the implant litigation an essential
precondition to the economic turnabout that would be necessary to repay any investment.”); Bowling, 143
F.R.D. at 147 (“[T]he presence of pending litigation . . . could jeopardize [defendant’s] ability to attract
investment.”).
30 See, e.g., David A. Dana & Susan P. Koniak, Secret Settlements and Practice Restrictions Aid Lawyer
Cartels and Cause Other Harms, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1217, 1235 (“[T]he court itself has an interest in
approving whatever deal is set before it as . . . rejection leaves the matter on its already clogged docket.”);
Koniak, supra note 16, at 1798 (stating that judges have “an even bigger interest in seeing large and
cumbersome class actions settle”); Susan P. Koniak and George M. Cohen, In Hell There Will Be Lawyers
Without Clients or Law, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 129, 151 (2001) (“Rejecting a settlement that clears not only
one’s own docket but the dockets of colleagues is not apt to win a judge the praise of fellow judges.”);
Rhonda Wasserman, Secret Class Action Settlements, 31 REV. LITIG. 889, 934–35 (2012) (“[T]he court has its
own incentive to favor class action settlements. If a court approves a class action settlement[,] . . . it is freed of
the burden of overseeing a large and potentially time-consuming case. It may also gain prestige as the court
that oversaw the settlement of a complex class action.” (footnotes omitted)).
31 Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 16, at 267 (“[S]ettlement removed a potential enormous drain on
judicial resources.”).
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is able to avoid bankruptcy32 or reduce its transaction costs, or if the claimants’
own attorneys’ fees and costs are reduced as a result of the settlement.33 Future
claimants in particular may benefit from a global settlement if funds are
specifically set aside for their benefit rather than run the risk that the current
claimants will exhaust the defendants’ resources.34 And of course, both current
and future claimants avoid the risk of a total loss at trial.35
Given these benefits, we understand why defendants insist on global peace
and how a comprehensive settlement might even benefit other parties. But
global peace is often an unattainable goal. It is unattainable because some
future claimants cannot be bound by a class action judgment and cannot
consent to a nonclass aggregate settlement. To understand why at least certain
future claimants cannot be bound, we must first gain a better understanding of
the complexities inherent in the definition of “future claimants.”
II. THE CATEGORY OF FUTURE CLAIMANTS: HETEROGENEOUS, FLUID, AND
POROUS
Judges and scholars sometimes refer to “future claimants” as though they
form a discrete, well-defined, and homogeneous group. In fact, however, the
category of “future claimants” is heterogeneous, fluid, and porous. Because
these characteristics help explain why some future claimants cannot be bound
by class action judgments, it is worth our time to explore the nature of, and
variations among, future claimants.

32 See, e.g., Juris, 685 F.3d at 1304 (noting that class counsel concluded that the “claimants, whether
their injuries had manifested or not, had a common interest in securing a certain source of recovery for their
claims; none would be well served by the alternatives of default, insolvency, or bankruptcy”); In re Inter-Op
Hip Prosthesis Liab. Litig., 204 F.R.D. 330, 358 (N.D. Ohio 2001) (predicting that in the absence of a class
action settlement, “at least one of the [defending parties] will go bankrupt, [and] the majority of the class
members will not actually receive compensatory relief promptly (if at all)”).
33 If claimants’ attorneys’ fees and costs can be reduced, the potential savings are enormous. See, e.g.,
CARROLL ET AL., supra note 26, at 88, 103 (finding asbestos “claimants’ legal fees and expenses added up to
about $19 billion, 27 percent of the total spending on asbestos personal injury claims through 2002”).
34 See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 598 (1997) (noting that, in the absence of a
global resolution of asbestos litigation, “exhaustion of assets threatens and distorts the process; and future
claimants may lose altogether” (quoting REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON
ASBESTOS LITIGATION 2–3 (1991)); id. at 618 (describing “concerns about . . . the conservation of funds to
compensate claimants who do not line up early in a litigation queue”).
35 Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 16, at 267 (noting that the Vioxx settlement provided “substantial
compensation” even though “[p]laintiffs had faced a vigorous defense and had seen only mixed success” in
court).
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As Judge Diane Wood has written, not all future claimants face identical
risks. Depending upon the deleterious substance or defective product to which
they have been exposed, some future claimants will suffer a cognizable injury
in the future, while others may suffer an injury after a period of time.36 In some
cases, an exposed individual may suffer an injury at one point in time but the
“injury will not become ascertainable to the claimant until some time in the
future.”37 In other words, there may be an anatomical change that causes no
immediate effect on a future claimant’s daily life.38
In addition to these differences regarding the likelihood and timing of
cognizable injury, there are critical differences among future claimants
regarding their awareness of their exposure and the risks they face. Some
individuals are well aware of their exposure to a defective product or
contaminant. For example, individuals who have had hip socket implants are
well aware that they underwent the surgical procedure; the same can be said,
for example, of women who had silicone breast implants. They may not know
yet whether they will suffer an injury, and to that extent they are
“unknowing”;39 but they are aware of their exposure to the deleterious
substance or defective product. For that reason, they are both “unknowing” and
“exposure-aware” future claimants.
Some exposure-aware future claimants will be known to the defendant. For
example, a product manufacturer may have records (or access to records) with
the names of all or many individuals who received its product. Once the
manufacturer learns of the product’s potential risks, it can notify those
36 Wood, supra note 9, at 1933–34; see, e.g., In re Inter-Op Litig., 204 F.R.D. at 336, 341 (noting, in case
involving allegedly defective hip socket implants, “some class members may suffer no adverse medical affects
[sic], while others may suffer (and have suffered) terribly”).
37 Wood, supra note 9, at 1934; see also In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig. (Agent Orange II), 996
F.2d 1425, 1433–34 (2d Cir. 1993) (concluding that soldiers exposed to Agent Orange were “injured” upon
exposure even if they did not manifest symptoms until years later).
38 See, e.g., CARROLL ET AL., supra note 26, at 7–8 (explaining that, under the American Medical
Association’s definition, an individual with a scar on her lungs would be impaired (or injured) because she
would suffer an “abnormality in anatomic structure” but “if there were no abnormality in lung function and no
decrease in the ability to perform activities of daily living, the individual would be assigned a 0% impairment
rating” (quoting LINDA COCCHIARELLA & GUNNAR B. J. ANDERSSON, GUIDES TO THE EVALUATION OF
PERMANENT IMPAIRMENT 88 (5th ed. 2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). In the RAND report’s
language, an individual “who experiences no decrease in the ability to perform the activities of daily life, even
if he or she has evidence of an injury,” would be considered “unimpaired.” Id. at 8.
39 See, e.g., Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 80
CORNELL L. REV. 1045, 1086 (1995) (noting that some future claimants can “not be identified by the
parties, . . . [and have] not yet manifested injury at the time the action was brought”); see also infra note 43
and accompanying text.
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individuals known to have received the product and such individuals can seek
guidance in an effort to understand the risks they face and the litigation options
they have.40 Such claimants are “known” and “exposure-aware” but
“unknowing” regarding the extent, if any, of their injuries.
Contrast these individuals with, say, shipyard workers thirty or forty years
ago, who may not have even realized that they were exposed to asbestos.41 It
would be much more difficult to identify and notify these potential future
claimants, and much harder for them to appreciate the risks they face. To make
the example even more extreme, imagine the children of those who worked
with asbestos, who were exposed only through contact with their parents’ work
clothes.42 The odds of identifying and notifying them would be even longer,
their lack of awareness more obvious, and their ability to understand the risks
they face even more doubtful. In Professor Susan Koniak’s words, these future
claimants are not just unknown, but “unknowing”; they “[can]not be identified
by the parties, . . . [have] not yet manifested injury at the time the action was
brought, and . . . might not have known then or now that they had been exposed
to the hazardous product.”43 In fact, they are both “unknowing” (of the extent
of their prospective illness) and “unaware” (of their exposure).
Others who were not themselves exposed may have (or acquire)
prospective claims by virtue of their relationship (or future relationship) with
exposed individuals. For example, individuals who have not yet met workers
exposed to asbestos in the workplace may state claims for loss of consortium
once they marry, and their yet-to-be-born children may have claims upon birth
by virtue of their relationships with their exposed parents.44 Thus, at least in
40 See, e.g., Juris v. Inamed Corp., 685 F.3d 1294, 1304–05, 1317 n.21 (11th Cir. 2012) (describing the
original district court plan, in a (b)(1)(B) limited fund class action, to provide women with Inamed silicone
breast implants approximately “the level and quality of notice required by Rule 23(b)(3)” and noting that the
trial judge who rejected the plaintiff’s collateral attack distinguished between “exposure-only asbestos tort
claimants, who may not know of their exposure until they contract asbestos-related illnesses,” and breast
implant recipients, who “know that they have had implants and are capable of being notified,” whether the
implants leaked and caused injury or not); In re Inter-Op Litig., 204 F.R.D. at 347 (“[T]here is no question in
this case regarding who was actually exposed to the defective product.”); see also infra Part III.A.
41 See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 628 (1997) (“Many persons in the
exposure-only category . . . may not even know of their exposure, or realize the extent of the harm they may
incur.”).
42 Id. at 602 & n.5 (noting that the complaint defined the class to include “[a]ll persons . . . who have
been exposed . . . through the occupational exposure of a . . . household member, to asbestos”).
43 Koniak, supra note 39, at 1086 (emphasis added).
44 Amchem, 521 U.S. at 602 (describing the proposed class and noting that it included persons “whose
spouse or family member had been . . . exposed” to asbestos); see also Meachem v. Wing, 227 F.R.D. 232,
236–37 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (describing the “minors or the yet-to-be-born,” who, later in life, might move to New
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theory, a class may include not just unknowing claimants but also “contingent”
claimants—those whose claims are contingent upon a relationship (or future
relationship) with an exposed individual.
Not only are there important differences among future claimants but the
boundary between the categories of future claimants and current claimants is
porous and fluid as well.45 An individual exposed to a deleterious substance
who suffers no immediate injury would ordinarily be classified as a future
claimant. But once she develops symptoms, she would become a current
claimant; thus, she would easily pass from one category to the other.
Moreover, a current claimant with specific symptoms and a particular
diagnosis at one point in time might develop additional symptoms later on,
receiving a new diagnosis.46 For example, individuals exposed to asbestos
might develop asbestosis first, only to be diagnosed with mesothelioma later in
life.47 After the first diagnosis but before the second, such individuals could be
viewed, simultaneously, as current and future claimants.48
Like the boundary between future and current claimants, the boundary
between future claimants and the public at large is also porous and fluid. Many
individuals exposed to asbestos in the workplace will, following a lengthy
latency period, eventually suffer asbestos-related diseases;49 they are easily
characterized as future claimants. But what about the rest of us? According to a
York City, receive public assistance, and then have a claim challenging the adequacy of the City’s procedures
for terminating or reducing such aid, and noting that “[t]hese individuals have no reason to believe that their
rights are being adjudicated in the present proceeding”).
45 E.g., Deborah R. Hensler, Bringing Shutts into the Future: Rethinking Protection of Future Claimants
in Mass Tort Class Actions, 74 UMKC L. REV. 585, 604 (2006) (stating that “the line [between current and
future claimants] is blurred and ever changing”).
46 See, e.g., Note, Claim Preclusion in Modern Latent Disease Cases: A Proposal for Allowing Second
Suits, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1989, 1989 (1990) (“Victims of toxic torts face the problem that a single exposure to
a toxicant may produce both immediate and latent diseases.”).
47 Id. (“Typically, victims first suffer asbestosis; many years later, some of the same victims also develop
cancer.”).
48 See also Geoffrey P. Miller, Conflicts of Interest in Class Action Litigation: An Inquiry into the
Appropriate Standard, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 581, 609 (noting that in class actions seeking both money
damages and injunctive relief, “members of the class who expect to use the defendant’s product or services
will be, in effect, future as well as present claimants”).
49 See, e.g., Amchem, 521 U.S. at 598 (describing the lengthy latency period and noting that “a
continuing stream of [asbestos] claims can be expected” and expressing concern that “future claimants may
lose altogether” (quoting REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 34, at 2–3)); Samantha Y.
Warshauer, Note, When Futures Fight Back: For Long-Latency Injury Claimants in Mass Tort Class Actions,
Are Asymptomatic Subclasses the Cure to the Disease?, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1219, 1221 n.13 (2004)
(defining “long-latency future injury plaintiffs” as “those plaintiffs who manifest injuries a long, but
indeterminate, amount of time after their exposure to a toxin”).
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fact sheet prepared by the National Cancer Institute, “Everyone is exposed to
asbestos at some time during their life. Low levels of asbestos are present in
the air, water, and soil.”50 Are we all future claimants?51
Another simple example, borrowed from Judge Wood,52 reinforces this
point. Individuals who smoked cigarettes for years but have not (yet)
developed lung cancer are fairly classified as future claimants.53 But haven’t
all of us (of a certain age) been exposed to second-hand smoke in bars or
restaurants (or even at home or in the workplace)?54 Since the dividing line
between future claimants and the public at large is porous, fluid, and poorly
defined, the potential breadth of the future claimants category is breathtaking.55
III. CONSTITUTIONAL BARRIERS TO BINDING UNKNOWING,
EXPOSURE-UNAWARE, AND CONTINGENT FUTURE CLAIMANTS
The quest for global peace will often be unattainable because courts cannot
enter class action judgments that bind unknowing, exposure-unaware, and
contingent future claimants regarding claims for money damages. Two
constitutional requirements prove insurmountable: notice and adequate
representation.

50

Asbestos Exposure and Cancer Risk, National Cancer Institute Fact Sheet, NAT’L CANCER INST.,
http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/factsheet/Risk/asbestos (last updated May 1, 2009) (emphasis added).
51 See, e.g., Wood, supra note 9, at 1934 (“In some cases, . . . it will be nearly impossible to distinguish
potential victims from members of society at large, and people will have no idea that they have a potential
future claim.”).
52 Id. (“Who has not breathed in some environmental tobacco smoke?”).
53 See, e.g., Donovan v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 268 F.R.D. 1, 5, 28, 29 (D. Mass. 2010) (certifying a
class of long-term smokers who had not yet developed lung cancer); cf. Thompson v. Am. Tobacco Co., 189
F.R.D. 544, 548 (D. Minn. 1999) (declining to certify a proposed class that included, among others, current
and former smokers “who do not currently suffer from smoking-relat[ed] illnesses but who are at an increased
risk of suffering from such illnesses”).
54 See, e.g., Secondhand Smoke (SHS) Facts, Smoking & Tobacco Use, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL
& PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statistics/fact_sheets/secondhand_smoke/general_facts/ (last
updated April 11, 2014) (“Since 1964, 2.5 million nonsmokers have died from exposure to secondhand
smoke. . . . An estimated 88 million nonsmokers in the United States were exposed to secondhand smoke in
2007–2008. . . . Today about half of the children between ages 3 and 18 in the U.S. are exposed to cigarette
smoke regularly, either at home or in places such as restaurants that still allow smoking.” (citations omitted)).
55 See, e.g., Meachem v. Wing, 227 F.R.D. 232, 234 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). In Meachem, the court declined to
approve a settlement in a (b)(2) class action of the claims of persons who were not then eligible for public
assistance but who, in the future, would receive it, and concluded “that a wide swath of the living population
potentially may be part of this class. . . . The class definition is both ‘sprawling’ and ‘amorphous.’” Id.
(quoting Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 622, 628 (1997)).
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A. Inability to Provide Reasonable Notice
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment bars the state from
depriving persons of property through adjudication without notice and an
opportunity to be heard.56 Without adequate notice, the opportunity to be heard
in court would be useless.57 In the class action context—where absentees
typically sit back and allow others to represent their interests—notice is
principally intended “to alert class members to their right to ‘opt out’”58 and to
pursue their individual interests in litigation they initiate on their own. In the
settlement context, notice is necessary to enable absent class members to gauge
the adequacy of the settlement and decide whether to opt out or to object to the
settlement.59
In class actions predominantly for money damages—such as Rule 23(b)(3)
class actions—both Rule 23 and due process require notice satisfying the
Mullane test.60 Rule 23(c)(2)(B) requires the court in (b)(3) class actions to
56

Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S.
32, 40 (1940). See generally RHONDA WASSERMAN, PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 129–34, 147–53 (2004) (discussing Mullane and notice in the class action
context).
57 Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314 (“This right to be heard has little reality or worth unless one is informed that
the matter is pending and can choose for himself whether to appear or default, acquiesce or contest.”). Under
Mullane, “[a]n elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be
accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of
the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Id. at 314. But “when
notice is a person’s due, process which is a mere gesture is not due process. The means employed must be such
as one desirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it.” Id. at 315.
58 Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997); see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,
131 S. Ct. 2541, 2559 (2011) (“[Rule 23](b)(2) does not require that class members be given notice and
opt-out rights, presumably because it is thought (rightly or wrongly) that notice has no purpose when the class
is mandatory . . . .”); accord 3 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 8:3, at 242–43 (5th
ed. 2013) (suggesting that “the mandatory nature of [(b)(1) and (b)(2)] cases may be precisely why class
members would want to know of them—such notice would better enable them to monitor class counsel’s
pursuit of their rights and/or to intervene to protect their interests” but also noting that “the importance of
providing individualized notice recedes” if class members “share the same interests”); cf. Rutherglen, supra
note 18, at 272 (questioning the proposition that (b)(1) and (b)(2) class members are not entitled to notice and
arguing “when exit is not a possibility, the choice between voice and loyalty becomes all the more important”
and suggesting class members “are entitled to notice so that they have an opportunity to object to the class
attorneys’ performance”).
59 3 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 58, § 8:14, at 270–72.
60 Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811–12 & n.3 (1985) (holding that in class actions that
“seek to bind known plaintiffs concerning claims wholly or predominately for money judgments” who are
beyond the jurisdictional reach of the court, due process requires notice, an opportunity to be heard, a right to
opt out, and adequate representation); see also Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2559 (identifying “the serious
possibility” that the Due Process Clause may require notice and the right to opt out even “where the monetary
claims do not predominate”).
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“direct to class members the best notice that is practicable under the
circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be
identified through reasonable effort.”61 According to the 1966 Advisory
Committee note, the Rule’s notice requirement “is designed to fulfill
requirements of due process to which the class action procedure is of course
subject.”62 The Advisory Committee reinforced its conclusion that the Due
Process Clause underlies the individual notice requirement by citing to
Mullane and Hansberry v. Lee, among other sources,63 and the Supreme Court
has affirmed that conclusion.64
While scholars have questioned whether due process requires individual
notice in class actions presenting negative-value claims,65 few if any doubt the
61

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B).
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d)(2) advisory committee’s note (1966).
63 Id. (citing, inter alia, Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); Hansberry v.
Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940)); see also Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 173–74 (1974) (“The
Committee explicated its incorporation of due process standards by citation to [Mullane] and like cases.”).
64 For example, in addressing the due process protections to which absent class members who lack
minimum contacts with the forum are entitled, the Court in Shutts held that,
62

If the forum State wishes to bind an absent plaintiff concerning a claim for money damages or
similar relief at law, it must provide minimal procedural due process protection. The plaintiff
must receive notice plus an opportunity to be heard and participate in the litigation, whether in
person or through counsel. The notice must be the best practicable, “reasonably calculated, under
all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them
an opportunity to present their objections.”
472 U.S. at 811–12 (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314–15) (footnote omitted)); see also Eisen, 417 U.S. at
176–77 (rejecting the argument that “adequate representation, rather than notice, is the touchstone of due
process in a class action” and hinting that the Due Process Clause itself might require individual notice to
identifiable class members by noting “quite apart from what due process may require, the command of Rule
23 is clearly to the contrary” (emphasis added)); cf. Agent Orange II, 996 F.2d 1425, 1435 (2d Cir. 1993)
(concluding with respect to “persons who are unaware of an injury” that notice “would probably do little
good” and their “rights are better served, we think, by requiring fair and just recovery procedures . . . and by
ensuring that they receive vigorous and faithful vicarious representation” (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)). According to Professor George Rutherglen, in Shutts, “the issue of adequate notice was tied up with
the issue of personal jurisdiction over members of the class. The statements in the opinion endorsing individual
mailed notice as a constitutional requirement must be interpreted in this light.” Rutherglen, supra note 18, at
265 n.24 (citation omitted).
65 See, e.g., Cramton, supra note 9, at 824 (“[O]pting out of [a negative-value] class is neither feasible
nor practical. . . . [F]urthermore, an individual claim worth so little need not receive the same due process
protection as a substantive tort claim worth many thousands of dollars.”); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Class
Certification Based on Merits of the Claims, 69 TENN. L. REV. 1, 6 (2001) (proposing the elimination of “the
requirement of individual notice in consumer class suits” because “it seems . . . absurd to require individual
notice in a type of case in which . . . prosecution by individual actions would be a practical impossibility”);
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative
Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 28, 31 (1991)
(maintaining that in “large-scale, small-claim class action [cases] . . . the members of the plaintiff class would
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importance of individual notice in class actions presenting positive-value
claims,66 where the rights to opt out and object are meaningful and individual
notice is necessary to protect them. To facilitate the exercise of these rights in
the settlement context, the class action notice must be “sufficiently clear and
informative”67 to enable class members to gauge the adequacy of the
settlement and to decide whether to object or opt out (assuming a back-end
opt-out right is afforded).
The question here is whether notice satisfying due process can be provided
to unknowing and contingent future claimants. In addressing this question, it
may help to differentiate between known, exposure-aware claimants, on the
one hand, and contingent, exposure-unaware claimants, on the other. Notice
can be mailed to known, exposure-aware claimants, and some courts have
concluded that such claimants can understand the benefits they will receive
under the settlement and the risks they will face by remaining in the class. In
fact, several courts have certified positive-value class actions seeking money
damages on behalf of unknowing but exposure-aware future claimants.68 For
example, in a class action against the manufacturer of a prosthetic hip socket,
the district court approved a preliminary notice plan, which provided for
individual notice by first class mail “to all Class Members who can be

ordinarily be far better off dispensing with notice” and arguing that “due process should not require
individualized notice of small claimants prior to judgment or settlement in this specialized class action
context”); Rutherglen, supra note 18, at 289 (opining that “[i]ndividual notice and the right to opt out should
be saved for the cases in which it really matters to the class members themselves,” i.e., where class members
have positive-value claims); David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 913, 936–37 (1998) (questioning the sense of providing individual notice to all claimants in
negative-value class actions and suggesting that “flexible notions of due process” do not require it).
66 See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Clifford W. Berlow, The Class Action as Political Theory, 85 WASH. U.
L. REV. 753, 758 n.19, 762 (2007) (describing positive-value class actions as “those class actions where
individual claims are sufficiently large so that ‘each claim would be independently marketable even in the
absence of the class action device’” (quoting John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation:
Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 905 (1987))).
67 3 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 58, § 8:17, at 277.
68 See, e.g., In re Certainteed Fiber Cement Siding Litig., —F.R.D.—, 2014 WL 1096030 (E.D. Pa.
2014) (approving the settlement of consolidated class actions filed on behalf of property owners whose fiber
cement siding was allegedly defective, including owners whose siding had not yet failed); In re Inter-Op Hip
Prosthesis Liab. Litig., 204 F.R.D. 330, 338–49 (N.D. Ohio 2001) (granting motion for conditional class
certification and preliminary approval of a proposed settlement, which would bind persons with manufactured
hip implants that had not yet failed); Bates v. Tenco Servs., Inc., 132 F.R.D. 160, 163 (D.S.C. 1990)
(certifying a class action pursuing property damage and personal injury claims resulting from ground water
contamination and seeking recovery for harm suffered “now, in the past and in the future” (emphasis added));
cf. supra note 40 (discussing Juris v. Inamed Corp., 685 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2012)).
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identified through reasonable efforts.”69 Even those class members whose
prosthetic hip socket implants had not yet failed could be identified through
reasonable effort and notified.70 The court found that they could understand the
risk of implant failure and the consequences of such a failure.71 The range of
possible outcomes was limited—either the implant would fail, or it would not,
and if it did, the individual would be medically eligible for surgery to replace
it, or she would not. Each class member would know whether her implant
would fail within a discrete period of time—approximately two years.72 The
unknowing future claimants could understand the benefits offered to them
under the settlement and the risks they assumed (and potential advantages they
might gain) if they opted out and preserved the right to sue separately.73
Therefore, the court concluded, the due process concerns were not deemed
insurmountable.74
Other courts have questioned whether notice satisfying due process can be
provided to unknowing but exposure-aware future claimants. For example, in a
class action brought on behalf of patients who took a drug for epilepsy and
who had or would develop liver failure as a result, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals expressed concern that “notice may be problematic” because “many
potential members of the classes cannot yet know if they are part of the class.
We therefore have serious due process concerns about whether adequate
notice under Rule 23(c)(2) can be given to all class members.”75 Likewise, in a
class action brought on behalf of past or current users of an anti-depressant
who had or would suffer severe withdrawal symptoms before the conclusion of
the litigation, the United States District Court for the Central District of
California noted: “Due process concerns abound as well. Since many Paxil
users cannot know if they will be part of the class at this time, the Court doubts
that those users can be provided notice adequate to allow them to make an
informed decision whether to opt out.”76 Even if they are aware of their
69 Proposed Joint Plan for Preliminary Notice of Pendency of Class Action and Proposed Settlement at 2,
In re Inter-Op Hip Prosthesis Liab. Litig., MDL Docket No. 01-CV-9000 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 18, 2001), ECF
No. 73.
70 In re Inter-Op Litig., 204 F.R.D. at 347 (“[T]here is no question in this case regarding who was
actually exposed to the defective product.”).
71 Id.
72 Id. at 335–36.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 348–49.
75 Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added) (vacating an
order certifying a class).
76 In re Paxil Litig., 212 F.R.D. 539, 545 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (citing Valentino, 97 F.3d at 1234).
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exposure and receive notice of the class action, future claimants who suffer no
present injuries may not pay sufficient attention to the notice received and may
not have the information they need to make an informed decision whether or
not to opt out.77
If there is doubt that adequate notice can be provided in positive-value class
actions to known but unknowing, exposure-aware future claimants, those
doubts are greatly magnified regarding unknown, exposure-unaware, and
contingent future claimants. The Supreme Court has addressed this issue,
either directly or obliquely, in three landmark cases. First, Mullane
acknowledged that when conditions do not permit notice that “is in itself
reasonably certain to inform those affected,”78 due process requires “that the
form chosen is not substantially less likely to bring home notice than other of
the feasible and customary substitutes.”79 More specifically, the Court
sanctioned notice by publication:
This Court has not hesitated to approve of resort to publication as a
customary substitute in another class of cases where it is not
reasonably possible or practicable to give more adequate warning.
Thus it has been recognized that, in the case of persons missing or
unknown, employment of an indirect and even a probably futile
means of notification is all that the situation permits and creates no
constitutional bar to a final decree foreclosing their rights.80

In Mullane itself, the Court upheld notice by publication to beneficiaries
whose interests were conjectural or future, to contingent beneficiaries, and to
those “whose interests or addresses [were] unknown to the trustee.”81 Having
already acknowledged the futility of notice by publication alone,82 the Mullane
77 Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 622 (3d Cir. 1996) (identifying the objectors’ concerns
regarding notice), aff’d sub nom. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 632 (1997); see also, e.g.,
Cramton, supra note 9, at 836 (“Even if [unknowing future claimants] see or read [broadcast notices], the lack
of a specific injury denies them the opportunity to make an informed opt-out choice.”); Koniak, supra note 39,
at 1087 (“[H]ow does one provide notice and the opportunity to opt out to the unknowing? It cannot be done, if
notice means apprising those people that an action is pending that affects them. . . . [T]hose class members
cannot know in any meaningful sense that they are members of the class.”); Koniak, supra note 16, at 1830
n.230 (questioning the adequacy of notice to one who is not yet sick).
78 Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950).
79 Id.
80 Id. at 317.
81 Id. at 318.
82 Id. at 315–16. Of course, notice by publication today can include radio and television advertisements,
internet postings, notices on social media platforms like Facebook, and other means not contemplated by the
Mullane Court in 1950, which may improve its efficacy. See, e.g., In re Certainteed Fiber Cement Siding
Litig., —F.R.D.—, 2014 WL 1096030, at *14–15 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (finding notice by regular mail email and
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Court nevertheless approved it regarding the future and contingent
beneficiaries in light of the state’s “insistent” and customary interest “in
providing means to close trusts that exist[ed] by the grace of its laws and
[were] administered under the supervision of its courts.”83 In other words,
where the state itself has an interest in securing closure and enacts a law to
achieve that objective—for example, where it adopts a statute to facilitate the
administration of estates or trusts established under its laws the beneficiaries of
which may be absent from the state for lengthy periods84—it may provide
notice by publication to unknown and unknowing persons as long as the statute
adopts safeguards to protect their interests. But it is difficult to extrapolate
from Mullane the authority to enter judgments depriving unknown and
exposure-unaware individuals of positive-value monetary claims in the
absence of meaningful notice, other meaningful safeguards to protect their
interests, or an insistent state interest in closure and a statute enacted to further
that interest.
Second, while the Court in Shutts explicitly held that due process requires
individual notice in (b)(3) class actions, at least regarding absentees beyond the
court’s jurisdictional reach, it limited its holding “to those class actions which
seek to bind known plaintiffs concerning claims wholly or predominately for
money judgments.”85 Thus, Shutts expressly declined to address whether the
Due Process Clause permits judgments that purport to bind unknown future
claimants regarding monetary claims, and if so, the type of notice to which
they are entitled.86

“publication by newspaper, radio, television and the internet” was adequate); Koniak, supra note 39, at 1086–
87 (conceding that unknown plaintiffs can be notified through television, radio, and newspaper advertisements
as long as they are aware of their exposure, especially if their injuries have already manifested).
83 Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313, 317–18.
84 See, e.g., Cunnius v. Reading Sch. Dist., 198 U.S. 458, 469 (1905) (“[T]he right to regulate concerning
the estate or property of absentees is an attribute, which, in its very essence, must belong to all
governments . . . .”), cited in Mullane, 339 U.S. at 317.
85 Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811 n.3 (1985) (emphasis added).
86 In the Agent Orange litigation, the Second Circuit initially refused to extend Shutts’s holding
(requiring individualized notice) to unknown and unknowing future claimants and affirmed a judgment
binding absent future class members who received no individualized notice and who were not informed of
their opportunity to opt out. See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig. (Agent Orange I), 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir.
1987). Here, the Second Circuit found that the “creative approach” to notice adopted by the district court was
“appropriate to this unique case.” Id. at 167. While the court acknowledged that “the claims of the plaintiffs
are highly individualistic in a number of respects,” the court concluded that “[t]he interests of all of the
plaintiffs are identical . . . with regard to the facts and the law relevant to the military contractor defense. The
class members with actual notice therefore would have represented the interests of the class members unaware
of the action.” Id. at 169. The court also noted that since no “comprehensive list” of all veterans who served in

WASSERMAN GALLEYSPROOFS2

550

12/23/2014 12:14 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:531

Third, if the Court in Shutts mentioned class actions with unknown class
members only in passing, it dealt with one head-on in Amchem Products, Inc.
v. Windsor.87 Amchem involved a massive class action brought on behalf of
individuals who had not yet filed suit against the former-asbestos-manufacturer
defendants but who had been exposed to asbestos in the workplace or through
the occupational exposure of a spouse or household member as well as those
whose spouse or household member had been so exposed.88 After identifying
several reasons why the “sprawling class” could not be certified under
Rule 23,89 the Court turned to the “[i]mpediments to the provision of adequate
notice.”90 The Court acknowledged the Third Circuit’s concern that many
future class members “may not even know of their exposure, or realize the
extent of the harm they may incur.”91 Even if notice reached these unknowing
and exposure-unaware class members and they “fully appreciate[d] the
significance of class notice, those without current afflictions [might] not have
the information or foresight needed to decide, intelligently, whether to stay in
or opt out.”92 The Court conceded the impossibility of reaching “future spouses
and children of asbestos victims,” who obviously “could not be alerted to their
class membership.”93 While declining to “rule, definitively, on the notice
given” in Amchem, the Court “recognize[d] the gravity of the question whether
class action notice sufficient under the Constitution . . . could ever be given to

Vietnam could have been compiled there was “no feasible alternative to the notice plan adopted by the district
court.” See id.
In a collateral attack on the judgment filed by Vietnam veterans whose illnesses manifested only after
the settlement was approved, the Second Circuit again concluded that individual notice to all of the veterans
was not required. The court “again decline[d] to extend the Shutts holding into situations such as this.” See
Agent Orange II, 996 F.2d 1425, 1435 (2d Cir. 1993). The court noted the flexibility of due process and the
lack of an “easily accessible list of veterans.” Id. (quoting Agent Orange I, 818 F.2d at 169) (internal quotation
marks omitted). The court concluded that “society’s interest in the efficient and fair resolution of large-scale
litigation outweighs the gains from individual notice and opt-out rights, whose benefits here are conjectural at
best. . . . [P]roviding individual notice and opt-out rights to persons who are unaware of an injury would
probably do little good.” Id.
Only after the Supreme Court decided Amchem, discussed infra at notes 87–94 and accompanying text,
did the Second Circuit conclude, in yet another collateral attack on the Agent Orange judgment—this one filed
by claimants whose injuries manifested after the settlement fund had been exhausted—that the “plaintiffs
likely received inadequate notice.” Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249, 261 n.8 (2d Cir. 2001); see
also infra notes 112–22 and accompanying text.
87 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
88 Id. at 602 & n.5 (describing and quoting the class action complaint).
89 Id. at 622–28.
90 Id. at 628.
91 Id. (citing Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 633 (3d Cir. 1996)).
92 Id.
93 Id.
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legions so unselfconscious and amorphous.”94 Lower courts have declined to
certify (or affirm the certification of) positive-value class actions on behalf of
unknowing or contingent future claimants at least in part because of doubts
regarding the adequacy of notice,95 and scholars have shared these doubts.96
If the purpose of notice in positive-value (b)(3) class actions is to afford
class members the information they need to decide whether to opt out and sue
separately, object, or sit back and rely on the named representatives and class
counsel to represent their interests, it cannot fulfill this purpose regarding
contingent and exposure-unaware future claimants. Certainly, the contingent
claimants—the future children and spouses of the exposed individuals—cannot
be provided with meaningful notice. Obviously, notice to the unborn is entirely
out of the question. Even if contingent future spouses happened to see a notice
of the suit, its potential impact on their lives would be unfathomable to them.
Likewise, if exposure-unaware future claimants happened to receive notice of
the suit, it would be of no value to them; they would have no reason to pay it
any attention whatsoever.97 In sum, because the due process notice requirement

94 Id. The Court likewise declined to decide the notice question in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S.
815, 841 n.19 (1999) (“Since satisfaction or not of a notice requirement would not affect the disposition of this
case, we express no opinion on the need for notice or the sufficiency of the effort to give it in this case.”).
95 See, e.g., Georgine, 83 F.3d at 623, 633–34 (expressing “serious concerns as to the constitutional
adequacy of class notice” in a class action filed on behalf of those exposed to asbestos but declining to rule on
the issue, stating that “[i]t is unrealistic to expect every individual with incidental exposure to asbestos to
realize that he or she could someday contract a deadly disease and make a reasoned decision about whether to
stay in this class action” and concluding, “if this class action settlement were approved, some plaintiffs would
be bound despite a complete lack of knowledge of the existence or terms of the class action”); see also
Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249, 259–61 & n.8 (2d Cir. 2001) (concluding that absent class
members, whose identities were not known at the time of the settlement and whose injuries did not manifest
until after the settlement fund had been exhausted, were not bound by a prior class action settlement because
their interests had not been adequately represented and noting that “plaintiffs likely received inadequate
notice”); supra note 86.
96 See, e.g., Edward H. Cooper, Aggregation and Settlement of Mass Torts, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1943,
1975 (2000) (“[T]he difficulty of [providing] satisfactory notice may defeat the attempt to bind future
claimants by the proceeding.”); Cramton, supra note 9, at 835 (“[Unknowing class members] cannot be given
notice. They will not recognize that any notice applies to them, whatever the manner by which it is broadcast.
Unknowing future claimants have [no] effective opportunity to opt out during the notice period . . . .”);
Koniak, supra note 39, at 1089 (“How do we convince people who discover five years from now that they are
sick from exposure to some product that it was fair to have disposed of their claim years earlier without their
knowledge?”); Brian Wolfman & Alan B. Morrison, Representing the Unrepresented in Class Actions Seeking
Monetary Relief, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 439, 478 (1996) (suggesting that notice to future claimants in
“environmental toxin cases . . . is by its nature futile in some circumstances”).
97 See, e.g., Koniak, supra note 16, at 1830 n.230 (questioning whether one who is not sick would pay
any attention to a class action notice and doubting the efficacy of “[n]otice of hypothetical involvement”).
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cannot be satisfied, contingent and exposure-unaware future claimants cannot
be bound by class action judgments.98
B. Inability to Ensure Adequate Representation
Concerns regarding notice are compounded by concerns regarding the
adequacy of representation for unknowing and contingent future claimants.
Just as Rule 23(c)(2)’s notice requirement protects the due process rights of
absent class members,99 so too does Rule 23(a)(4)’s requirement that the class
representatives “fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.”100 As
the Supreme Court noted in Hansberry v. Lee, due process requires that the
interests of the absentees and those of the class representatives must be “of the
same class” and that the latter must “fairly represent the former in the
prosecution of the litigation of the issues in which all have a common
interest.”101
In assessing the adequacy of representation, courts must gauge both the
competence of class counsel and the “stature and interest” of the named
representatives.102 Courts must determine whether the named representatives
have the character and the means to vigorously prosecute the litigation;103

98

See Rutherglen, supra note 18, at 267 (“Different forms of notice at different stages in the proceedings
can . . . satisfy due process if the preclusive effects of the resulting judgment are suitably limited.”).
99 See supra notes 62–64 and accompanying text.
100 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4); see also 1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 58, § 3:50, at 320–21 (5th ed. 2011)
(noting that “the Constitution’s Due Process Clause and the rules of class action procedure both insist that the
class be ‘adequately’ represented” and that adequate representation has “dual bases in the Constitution and
Rule 23”)); 7A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 6, § 1765, at 317 (“The binding effect of all class-action
decrees raises substantial due-process questions that are directly relevant to Rule 23(a)(4).”).
101 311 U.S. 32, 41 (1940).
102 7A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 6, § 1766, at 346–47; see also, e.g., 1 RUBENSTEIN, supra
note 58, § 3:50, at 321 (noting adequacy’s “dual requirement of competent class representatives and class
counsel”); Linda S. Mullenix, Taking Adequacy Seriously: The Inadequate Assessment of Adequacy in
Litigation and Settlement Classes, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1687, 1698–99, 1703–05, 1716 (2004) (describing the
“hornbook” versions of the factors considered in assessing the adequacy of class counsel and the class
representative; contrasting two competing views of the representative’s role: the “potted plant” view and the
active fiduciary view). Mullenix maintains that, in practice, courts “routinely, reflexively, and presumptively
certify proposed class counsel as adequate without a sufficiently probing inquiry” and “virtually ignore the
class representative altogether.” Mullenix, supra, at 1699, 1703 (footnote omitted). She also expresses concern
that “the adequacy requirement is taken even less seriously when certification occurs at the back end of class
litigation, especially in the context of settlement-only classes.” Id. at 1716.
103 1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 58, §§ 3.68–3.69 (discussing the representative’s credibility, integrity, and
financial resources); 7A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 6, § 1766, at 352, § 1767, at 381–85.
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ensure that their interests do not conflict with those of the absentees;104
scrutinize their relationships with others to protect against collusion;105 screen
for potential conflicts between class counsel and the represented class;106 and
consider the competency, resources, experience, and potential conflicts of
interest of class counsel.107 This last factor is critical because, as one leading
treatise put it, “it is primarily class counsel, not the class representative, who
controls the class’s interest. The quality of that counsel is therefore
paramount.”108
In class actions that aim to bind both current and future claimants, conflicts
between class representatives—who are typically current claimants—and the
absent future claimants are particularly concerning. As the Supreme Court
explained in Amchem,
[N]amed parties with diverse medical conditions sought to act on
behalf of a single giant class rather than on behalf of discrete
subclasses. In significant respects, the interests of those within the
single class are not aligned. Most saliently, for the currently injured,
the critical goal is generous immediate payments. That goal tugs
against the interest of exposure-only plaintiffs in ensuring an ample,
inflation-protected fund for the future.109

104 1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 58, §§ 3:58–3:65; 7A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 6, § 1768, at
389; see also Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997) (“The adequacy inquiry under Rule
23(a)(4) serves to uncover conflicts of interest between named parties and the class they seek to represent.”);
Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 42–43 (stating that absent class members “may be bound by the [class action]
judgment where they are in fact adequately represented”).
105 7A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 6, § 1768, at 394; see also 1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 58,
§ 3:70, at 390–91 (describing the need to scrutinize the representative’s close relationship with class counsel to
ensure that the representative will not “be more interested in ensuring counsel’s fee than in protecting the
class’s interests”).
106 7A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 6, § 1768, at 423, § 1769.1, at 455.
107 Amchem, 521 U.S. at 626 n.20 (“The adequacy heading also factors in competency and conflicts of
class counsel.”); 1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 58, §§ 3:72–3:78; 7A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 6,
§ 1769.1, at 442–43 (stating that “attorneys for the class perform a major role in assuring that the
representation satisfies due-process standards” and noting that the court must “consider the quality and
experience of the attorneys for the class”); Mullenix, supra note 102, at 1735–38; see also FED. R. CIV. P.
23(g)(1)(A) (identifying four criteria that courts must consider in appointing class counsel, including “the work
counsel has done in identifying or investigating potential claims in the action” and “counsel’s knowledge of
the applicable law”); 1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 58, §§ 3:80–3:88 (analyzing Rule 23(g)).
108 1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 58, § 3:72, at 394. This view, regarding the primacy of effective counsel,
may explain why courts typically give very short shrift to the adequacy of the class representative. See
Mullenix, supra note 102, at 1709–11.
109 Amchem, 521 U.S. at 626; cf. Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 44 (noting that “[t]hose who sought to secure”
the “benefits” of the racially-restrictive covenant “by enforcing it could not be said to be in the same class with
or represent those whose interest was in resisting performance”).

WASSERMAN GALLEYSPROOFS2

554

12/23/2014 12:14 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:531

The failure of the Amchem representatives to negotiate a settlement that
protected future claimants from the risk of inflation reflected this conflict of
interest and the named parties’ inability to represent those whose interests were
different from their own.110 The district court’s willingness to approve the
settlement notwithstanding these (and other) problems illustrates the lack of
rigor with which many courts scrutinize the adequacy of representation in class
actions.111
Likewise, in Stephenson v. Dow Chemical Co., the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals concluded that absent future claimants were not bound by a prior class
action settlement because their interests had not been adequately
represented.112 An earlier class action settlement of Vietnam veterans’ claims
for injuries allegedly caused by Agent Orange had specifically purported to
bind “persons who have not yet manifested injury.”113 The settlement, which
the district court approved in 1984 and which the Second Circuit affirmed in
1987,114 provided for payments to be made over a ten-year period, ending
December 31, 1994.115 When veterans whose injuries had not manifested by
the time the settlement was approved later challenged it, both the district court
and the court of appeals concluded that the challengers were bound by the
settlement because future claimants like them had been part of the class and

110 Amchem, 521 U.S. at 627 (noting that “the settlement includes no adjustment for inflation”); see also,
e.g., Eubank v. Pella Corp., 753 F.3d 718, 721 (7th Cir. 2014) (identifying as a red flag the settlement’s
treatment of customers who had already replaced their defective windows and those who had not as a single
class; stating that “the adversity among subgroups requires that the members of each subgroup cannot be
bound by a settlement except by consents given by those who understand that their role is to represent solely
the members of their respective subgroups” (quoting In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 982 F.2d 721,
743 (2d Cir. 1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
111 See, e.g., Mullenix, supra note 102, at 1692 (“[C]ourts pay lip service to the concept of adequate
representation but fail to robustly engage in any meaningful inquiry to establish the existence of such adequate
representation.”). In her article, Professor Mullenix also advocates for “a more robust, meaningful set of
standards to govern courts in the adequacy determination . . . [and] a more robust, vigorous judicial scrutiny of
the adequacy requirement” and elaborates on concerns regarding judicial scrutiny of adequacy. Id. at 1692–93,
1696–1733.
112 273 F.3d 249, 259–61 (2d Cir. 2001); see also supra note 86. For far more thorough analyses of the
Agent Orange litigation, see, for example, PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS TOXIC
DISASTERS IN THE COURTS (1986); Koniak, supra note 16, at 1817–36; Mullenix, supra note 102, at 1718–33;
Linda S. Mullenix, Apocalypse Forever: Revisiting the Adequacy of the Agent Orange Settlement, Twenty-Five
Years Later, 2003 PREVIEW U.S. SUP. CT. CAS. 274.
113 In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 865 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (quoting the Settlement
Agreement).
114 Agent Orange I, 818 F.2d 145, 163–74 (2d Cir. 1987) (approving the class certification and the
settlement).
115 Stephenson, 273 F.3d at 253 (describing the settlement).
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their interests had been adequately represented.116 In particular, the district
court noted that “like all class members who suffer[ed] death or disability
before the end of 1994, [these plaintiffs were] eligible for compensation from
the Agent Orange Payment Fund.”117 Thus, because the future claimants were
entitled to the same recovery that had been made available to the current
claimants under the settlement agreement, no conflict of interest actually
materialized. Like the district court, the Second Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’
argument regarding the adequacy of representation, echoing the district court’s
finding that “the conflict between the interests of present and future claimants
[was] more imagined than real.”118
In Stephenson, on the other hand, the veterans who sought to collaterally
attack the judgment were not eligible for compensation from the fund because
their injuries had not manifested until after the ten-year pay-out period had
expired.119 “Because the prior litigation purported to settle all future claims,
but only provided for recovery for those whose death or disability was
discovered prior to 1994, the conflict between [the challengers] and the class
representatives [had become] apparent.”120 The Second Circuit cited Amchem
and Ortiz121 for support for the now-apparent proposition that “a class [that]
purports to represent both present and future claimants may encounter internal
conflicts.”122
Steps can be taken to protect against obvious conflicts of interest between
current and future claimants. Structural protections can be provided, such as
subclasses represented by individuals looking out “solely [for] the members of
116 Agent Orange II, 996 F.2d 1425, 1435–37 (2d Cir. 1993) (affirming that the representation of the
absent class members had been “more than adequate”); Ryan v. Dow Chem. Co. (In re Agent Orange Prod.
Liab. Litig.), 781 F. Supp. 902, 919 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
117 Ryan, 781 F. Supp. at 919.
118 Agent Orange II, 996 F.2d at 1435 (quoting Ryan, 781 F. Supp. at 919).
119 Stephenson, 273 F.3d at 251, 257–58.
120 Id. at 260.
121 Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 856 (1999); see infra notes 124–25 and accompanying text.
122 Stephenson, 273 F.3d at 261 & n.9.
Even in a (b)(2) class action, with its presumption of cohesion, the district court in Meachem v. Wing
declined to approve a settlement that purported to bind unknowing future claimants—those who were not then
receiving public assistance from New York City but who would receive benefits in the future and would have
a claim against the City regarding allegedly deficient procedures for the termination or reduction of such
benefits. 227 F.R.D. 232 (S.D.N.Y.), reconsideration denied, 227 F.R.D. 237 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). Because the
defendants’ obligations under the proposed settlement terminated after a fixed period of time but the class
members’ claims were “forever discharge[d],” the court found “subtle” potential conflicts between the current
recipients who served as class representatives and the absent future claimants; their interests were “not fully
aligned.” Id. at 236.
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their respective subgroups,”123 who have separate counsel.124 According to the
Supreme Court in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., “it is obvious after Amchem that
a class divided between holders of present and future claims (some of the latter
involving no physical injury and attributable to claimants not yet born) requires
division into homogeneous subclasses under Rule 23(c)(4)(B), with separate
representation to eliminate conflicting interests of counsel.”125
Class action scholars have echoed these recommendations. For example,
while they were both still with Public Citizen Litigation Group, Professors
Brian Wolfman and Alan Morrison called for the appointment of separate
counsel to represent future claimants, who would have authority to retain
consultants and medical experts to help inform the relief sought on behalf of
the future claimants.126 Separate counsel for future claimants would
presumably negotiate terms such as inflation protection and back-end opt-out
rights127 to protect future claimants whose problems might not manifest for
some time.128 Wolfman and Morrison also advocated discovery by objectors to
assess the fairness of the settlement,129 authority in the trial court to make
internal reallocations of settlement funds to cure conflicts of interest,130 an
obligation on the part of the trial court to perform a substantive review of the

123 Amchem, 521 U.S. at 627 (quoting In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 982 F.2d 721, 742–43 (2d
Cir. 1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted). For example, the trial court in Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., which was not prosecuted as a class action, nevertheless appointed separate guardians to
protect the interests of the interest beneficiaries, on the one hand, and the principal beneficiaries, on the other.
339 U.S. 306, 310 (1950).
124 See, e.g., Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 856.
125 Id. (citing, inter alia, Amchem, 521 U.S. at 627).
126 Wolfman & Morrison, supra note 96, at 477–80, 495 (specifying that counsel for the future claimants
should represent no “presently injured” claimants).
127 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(4) (“If the class action was previously certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the
court may refuse to approve a settlement unless it affords a new opportunity to request exclusion to individual
class members who had an earlier opportunity to request exclusion but did not do so.”); Rhonda Wasserman,
The Curious Complications with Back-End Opt-Out Rights, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 373, 383–85 (2007)
(describing four different circumstances in which absent class members have been afforded a delayed
opportunity to opt out).
128 See, e.g., Wolfman & Morrison, supra note 96, at 478 (“[T]he appointment of counsel dedicated to
representing future class members will, in itself, go a long way to correcting the worst abuses. Such counsel
would not . . . have agreed to a thirty-year settlement without some type of built-in inflation factor. . . .
[C]ounsel for future class members might insist on a viable back-end opt out . . . .”); see also, e.g., Cramton,
supra note 9, at 828 (“[A] court-approved settlement committee that is broadly representative of the class
should negotiate class action settlements affecting the rights of future tort claimants, or, alternatively, adequate
representation should be provided to subclasses by separate designation and representation.”).
129 Wolfman & Morrison, supra note 96, at 485–90.
130 Id. at 490–95.
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settlement to ensure its fairness to future claimants,131 and a presumption that
settlements purporting to bind future claimants must provide for inflation
protection.132
But while subclasses with separate representation may be able to alleviate
conflicts between current and future claimants in some cases, they may not be
able to assure adequate representation to exposure-unaware and contingent
future claimants. Several impediments exist. First, it will be impossible to find
representatives for the unaware or contingent future claimants who are
members of their respective subclasses.133 After all, by definition, unaware
future claimants do not know of their exposure, let alone the extent of their
injuries, if any.134 Since current case law requires that a class representative be
a member of the represented class,135 it will be impossible to find an individual
who is herself unaware of her exposure who can serve as a representative for
the exposure-unaware future claimants. Even more obvious, it will be
impossible to find a representative for the unborn future children of those
exposed or for the future spouses who have not yet met their partners if such
representatives must themselves be members of their respective subclasses.
It might be possible to amend Rule 23 to permit either the appointment of a
representative of a class or subclass of future claimants who is not herself a
member of the class or the appointment of an attorney to represent a class of
future claimants without a class representative in place. Professors Jonathan
Macey and Geoffrey Miller have argued that the class representative plays no
meaningful role (in negative-value class action litigation) and should be
dispensed with since it is the skill, integrity, and motivation of class counsel
that determines the quality of representation afforded the absentees.136 But
131 Id. at 495 (“In addition, we believe that the Rule should be changed to require the court to undertake a
substantive evaluation of the settlement’s fairness to subgroup members, particularly those with potential
future claims.”).
132 Id. at 478, 495–98.
133 See Cramton, supra note 9, at 835 (“Unknowing future claimants have . . . [no one] who can embody
their interests in the settlement negotiation or its review by the court.”); Koniak, supra note 16, at 1842 n.278
(“[T]here are real questions about whether [future claimants] can ever be adequately represented, particularly
if adequate representation includes a named representative who can fairly stand in for them . . . .”).
134 See supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text.
135 See, e.g., Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 156 (1982) (“[A] class representative must
be part of the class and possess the same interest and suffer the same injury as the class members.” (quoting E.
Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403 (1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
136 Macey & Miller, supra note 65. Macey and Miller posit that “the named plaintiff has little control over
how the suit is conducted, [so] the analysis should focus not on the appropriateness of the named plaintiff but
rather on the reliability and competence of the plaintiffs’ attorney” and recommend that “actual, identified
named plaintiffs not be required in large-scale, small-claim litigation. Instead, a plaintiffs’ attorney should be
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Article III requires that at least one named plaintiff have an actual “case or
controversy” with the defendant,137 and Macey and Miller concede that Article
III demands at least “some individual class members who have a concrete stake
in the outcome sufficient to satisfy traditional justiciability requirements.”138 If,
as several lower courts have held, Article III requires that each subclass have a
representative with standing,139 it will be impossible to certify a subclass of
contingent and exposure-unaware future claimants.140
Second, even if an attorney or a representative who was not herself a
member of the futures class or subclass could be appointed to represent
exposure-unaware and contingent future claimants, it would be hard for her to

allowed to bring ‘Jane Doe’ or ‘Richard Roe’ complaints on behalf of a class or corporation.” Id. at 5–6; see
also id. at 61–96 (elaborating on their critique of the named representative); Miller, supra note 48, at 620
(“Given the minimal nature of the representative plaintiff’s role, it is not clear that combining the roles of
named plaintiff and class counsel would have a discernible negative effect.”). But see, e.g., Mullenix, supra
note 102, at 1733–34 (advocating a rigorous assessment of the adequacy of the named representative and
rejecting the “view that treats class representatives as ‘standing’ ciphers or potted plants”). Professor Mullenix
also advocates for the development of “meaningful standards for the assessment of this requirement.” Id. at
1734.
137 O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 493–94 (1974) (concluding that the complaint failed to satisfy
Article III and maintaining that “if none of the named plaintiffs purporting to represent a class establishes the
requisite of a case or controversy with the defendants, none may seek relief on behalf of himself or any other
members of the class”); see also, e.g., Sw. Bell Yellow Pages, Inc. v. Waterin Hole, Inc.,
No. 03-96-03348-CV, 1997 WL 124110, at *3 (Tex. App. Mar. 20, 1997) (maintaining, as a matter of Texas
law, that “class representatives themselves, as well as counsel, [must] avidly pursue the claims of the class
members” and “the class is entitled to more than adequate counsel”).
138 Macey & Miller, supra note 65, at 83 (“[Article III policies underlying standing and mootness doctrine
are] quite adequately served as long as (1) there exist some individual class members who have a concrete
stake in the outcome sufficient to satisfy traditional justiciability requirements, and (2) class . . . counsel who
effectively control the litigation have framed the issues so as to create the requisite degree of adversary testing
and protection against collusive litigation. It should not be necessary . . . that there by any named plaintiff at
all.”).
139 See 3 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 58, § 7:31, at 162 n.40 (“Several district courts have required that
subclass representatives have Article III standing to bring the claims asserted by the subclasses they purport to
represent.” (citing McDonough v. Toys R Us, Inc., 638 F. Supp. 2d 461, 473 (E.D. Pa. 2009); Susan J. v.
Riley, 254 F.R.D. 439, 451 (M.D. Ala. 2008); Caranci v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of R.I., 194 F.R.D. 27, 32
(D.R.I. 2000))).
140 See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Back to the Futures: Privatizing Future Claims Resolution, 148 U. PA. L.
REV. 1919, 1927 (2000) (“Objectors in latent injury mass tort cases have argued that future claimants have no
actual injury and therefore can have no standing, an Article III ‘case and controversy’ objection.” (footnote
omitted)). The Supreme Court declined to address the standing issue in both Amchem Products, Inc. v.
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 612–13 (1997) and Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 831 (1999). Cf. Hazard,
supra note 3, at 1910 (“[I]f individual claims cannot be specified in terms of the identity of claimants and the
factual basis of their claims, then there is simply no basis for ‘adjudication’ of unknown claims on the part of
unknown claimants.”).
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adequately represent the interests of the absentees.141 Given the length of some
latency periods, a class action could be litigated or settled decades before the
future claimants would become ill.142 But medical science and technology
advance with such rapidity that it would be difficult, if not impossible, for the
representatives to anticipate future discoveries that would be made only years
or decades in the future and their potential impact on the claims of future
claimants.143 For example, doubts about causation may justify smaller
compensatory awards today,144 but future medical discoveries may establish
causation with (greater) certainty, thereby supporting much larger awards for
future claimants tomorrow.145 Lacking a crystal ball, representatives of future
claimants would have a very hard time knowing if the terms of the settlement
reached today would be fair to the absentees when they manifest symptoms
tomorrow. Likewise, there may be treatment options available tomorrow that a
representative today could not even anticipate. And the inability to predict
legal developments between the time of the class action settlement and the
141

See, e.g., Hensler, supra note 45, at 604–08 (identifying “myriad reasons to believe that future
representatives will not be adequate to the task of representing the interests of future claimants,” including
cognitive biases).
142 See, e.g., Amchem, 521 U.S. at 598 (noting that the latency period for asbestos-related diseases may be
as long as forty years); Buck Creek Coal Co. v. Sexton, 706 F.3d 756, 759 (6th Cir. 2013) (describing the
“latent and progressive nature of black lung disease” and affirming an award of disability benefits
notwithstanding a denial forty years earlier because “a claimant’s physical condition may be different at
entirely different times, and thus, the claims are not the same”), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 898 (2014).
143 See, e.g., Agent Orange I, 818 F.2d 145, 160 (2d Cir. 1987) (discussing the district judge’s refusal to
certify a class action against the government and noting his concern “that class certification would unfairly
preclude children with birth defects from bringing suit were future scientific studies to establish the validity of
their claims against the government”); Donovan v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 268 F.R.D. 1, 6, 30 (D. Mass.
2010) (discussing the advent of Low-Dose Computed Tomography (LDCT) scans, which identify lung cancer
at a much earlier stage than prior technologies such as x-rays and noting that “no form of precancerous
screening for lung cancer was an accepted standard of care until now”); cf. Agent Orange II, 996 F.2d 1425,
1436–37 (2d Cir. 1993) (“[D]espite continuing research, the crucial issue of ‘general causation’ . . . remains
unsettled. . . . Notwithstanding the . . . scientific developments of the past nine years, the chances of recovery
are nearly as speculative today as they were at the time of settlement.”).
144 See, e.g., Agent Orange I, 818 F.2d at 171–74 (describing the difficulties that plaintiffs would face in
seeking to prove that their ailments were caused by exposure to Agent Orange; concluding that these
“formidable hurdles” supported the conclusion that the settlement was reasonable); In re Serzone Prods. Liab.
Litig., 231 F.R.D. 221, 242–43 (S.D. W. Va. 2005) (citing “uncertainties regarding causation” and describing a
“reasonable compromise of causation issues”). The court in Serzone also noted that claimants’ “pre-existing
liver conditions . . . further complicate issues of causation” and concluded that the settlement’s objective
criteria “save claimants the burden of establishing causation as a matter of certainty while preventing
undesirable recoveries for groundless claims.” 231 F.R.D. at 243.
145 Cf. Robert L. Rabin, Continuing Tensions in the Resolution of Mass Toxic Harm Cases: A Comment,
80 CORNELL L. REV. 1037, 1038 (1995) (maintaining that the tort process “is far less suited for scientific
determinations of causation in long-latency illness and disease cases involving clinical, epidemiological, and
statistical analysis”).
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development of the future claimants’ injuries, which could bear on the strength
of their claims, could exacerbate these difficulties in providing adequate
representation to unknowing future claimants.146
In sum, neither meaningful notice nor adequate representation can be
provided to unknowing, exposure-unaware, or contingent future claimants.
Thus, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to secure global peace through a
class action judgment or settlement that is binding on future claimants.
IV. NONCLASS AGGREGATE SETTLEMENTS
In light of the constitutional challenges that bedevil mass tort class actions,
attorneys handling mass torts have largely abandoned class actions as the
principal vehicle for achieving global peace and have turned to nonclass
aggregate settlements instead.147 We will focus on two particular nonclass
aggregate settlement innovations to determine whether they might be
employed to achieve global peace and bind future claimants. One type,
epitomized by the Vioxx settlement, secures the commitment of all attorneys
representing eligible claimants to recommend the settlement to their clients and
to withdraw from representing any clients who reject the settlement. The other
146 Agent Orange II, 996 F.2d at 1436–37 (noting that “the scope of the government contract defense
[which had rendered the class claims weak] has been somewhat limited” by an intervening change in Supreme
Court precedent, but concluding that “there is a reasonable probability that it would apply, barring any
recovery by the plaintiffs” and rejecting plaintiffs’ challenges to the adequacy of representation); see also Alex
Raskolnikov, Note, Is There a Future for Future Claimants After Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor?, 107
YALE L.J. 2545, 2576 (1998) (“Because the values of current claims are based on existing legal rules, future
change in those rules will make the values obsolete.”).
147 See, e.g., Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 16, at 267, 272 (“[Since Amchem and Ortiz,] mass tort
lawyers largely abandoned any hope that settlement class actions would be the key to finding closure.
Nonclass aggregate settlements have filled this void . . . . After Amchem and Ortiz, lawyers understood that
Rule 23 was not an easy avenue for global settlements . . . .”); Samuel Issacharoff, Private Claims, Aggregate
Rights, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 183, 217 (“[In the Vioxx case,] a class action was too unwieldy because of the
elevated burdens on organizing a class after Amchem and Ortiz . . . .”).
“A non-class aggregate settlement is a settlement of the claims of two or more individual claimants in
which the resolution of the claims is interdependent.” ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, § 3.16(a). The resolution
of multiple claims is interdependent in two circumstances: if “the defendant’s acceptance of the settlement is
contingent upon the acceptance by a number or specified percentage of the claimants or specified dollar
amount of claims” or if “the value of each claimant’s claims is not based solely on individual case-by-case
facts and negotiations.” Id. § 3.16(b)(1)–(2). The Principles refer to these circumstances as “collective
conditionality”—“a defendant condition[s] its acceptance of a settlement on a specified number or percentage
of claimants agreeing to the settlement”—and “collective allocation”—the claimants’ claims are assigned
monetary values through a process other than claim-by-claim analysis of each claim’s respective merits. Id.
§ 3.16 cmts. b & c; see also Howard M. Erichson, A Typology of Aggregate Settlements, 80 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1769, 1784 (2005) (coining the phrases “collective conditionality” and “collective allocation”). I served
on the Members’ Consultative Group for the ALI Principles discussed here and infra Part IV.B.
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type, proposed in section 3.17(b) of the Principles of the Law of Aggregate
Litigation (the ALI Principles or the Principles) adopted by the ALI in 2009,
secures the prior consent of all claimants to be bound by a settlement approved
by a supermajority of the claimants.148 As we will see, unaware, unknowing
and contingent future claimants who cannot be bound by class action
judgments likewise cannot participate in, take advantage of, or be bound by
either of these nonclass aggregate settlement options. Thus, our analysis of
nonclass aggregate settlements reinforces our pessimistic conclusion that
global peace may be unattainable.
A. Vioxx-type “All-or-Nothing” Settlements
The agreement negotiated in the Vioxx case epitomizes the “all-or-nothing”
settlement agreement.149 The Vioxx agreement sought to resolve all claims
against the manufacturer Merck arising from the extended use of the painkiller
Vioxx, which allegedly heightened the users’ risk of heart attack and stroke.150
Eighteen bellwether trials against Merck were conducted, with five plaintiff
verdicts awarding large compensatory and punitive damages awards and
thirteen plaintiff losses.151 These trials motivated lawyers for both sides to
attempt to reduce their risks by negotiating a global $4.85 billion settlement,
which sought to resolve the claims of approximately 50,000 users.152
Rather than contend with the procedural hurdles to class certification and a
judicially-approved settlement,153 however, Merck and a group of plaintiffs’
attorneys with Vioxx clients negotiated a nonclass settlement. The settlement
148

ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, § 3.17(b).
See Erichson, supra note 16, at 981 (defining an “all-or-nothing” settlement as one that explicitly
conditions the agreement on the participation of all attorneys representing all (or nearly all) claimants
regarding a particular product failure or mass disaster or a settlement that otherwise “reveal[s] an expectation
of full participation or create[s] pressure to bind every member of the claimant group”).
150 Issacharoff, supra note 147, at 215–16; see also, e.g., Liptak, supra note 14, at A12.
151 Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 16, at 278; Issacharoff, supra note 147, at 216. Four of the plaintiffs’
verdicts were vacated or reduced on appeal. See Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 16, at 278 (citing Alexandra
D. Lahav, Rediscovering the Social Value of Jurisdictional Redundancy, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2369, 2394 nn.106–
07 (2008) (reviewing the Vioxx trial outcomes)).
152 Erichson, supra note 16, at 1000; Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 16, at 279; see also Settlement
Agreement Between Merck & Co., Inc. and the Counsel Listed on the Signature Pages Hereto, § 11.1, at 41–
42 (Nov. 9, 2007), available at http://www.officialvioxxsettlement.com/documents/Master%20Settlement%20
Agreement%20-%20new.pdf [hereinafter Vioxx Settlement Agreement]; Amendment to Settlement
Agreement (Jan. 17, 2008), available at http://www.officialvioxxsettlement.com/documents/Amendments%20
to%20Master%20Settlement%20Agreement.pdf.
153 See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 147, at 217 (“A publicly ordered settlement through the use of a class
action was too unwieldy because of the elevated burdens on organizing a class after Amchem and Ortiz . . . .”).
149

WASSERMAN GALLEYSPROOFS2

562

12/23/2014 12:14 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:531

was between Merck and the plaintiffs’ attorneys, rather than between Merck
and the claimants themselves.154 In the agreement, Merck offered to settle
Vioxx users’ claims on specified terms,155 but it committed to do so only if at
least eighty-five percent of all claimants accepted the terms of the offer.156
Otherwise, Merck could, in the language of the agreement, “walk away.”157
Several features made the settlement agreement particularly noteworthy
and controversial. As mentioned above, the agreement was between the
defendant Merck and the plaintiffs’ attorneys rather than the plaintiffs
themselves, even though the attorneys had no personal claims against
Merck.158 One may wonder how an agreement that did not purport to bind the
claimants could be expected to resolve their claims against Merck.159 Two
features of the agreement help answer this question. First, the agreement
required plaintiffs’ attorneys and law firms to recommend acceptance of the
offer to all of their eligible clients (the mandatory recommendation
provision).160 Second, if less than all of a firm’s Vioxx clients agreed to
participate, the firm had to withdraw from representation of the
nonparticipating clients (the mandatory withdrawal provision).161 As the
journalist Adam Liptak explained, “what lawyers promise[d] to do is settle on
behalf of all of their clients or none of them. That is, a lawyer with 100 clients
can participate in the settlement only if all 100 agree or if the lawyer fires those
clients who will not go along.”162 From the perspective of an individual
claimant, these terms were coercive because, as Professor Howard Erichson
put it, “Any client who declined the settlement faced the prospect of losing a

154 Vioxx Settlement Agreement, supra note 152, at 1 (identifying the parties to the agreement); see also
Liptak, supra note 14, at A12.
155 Vioxx Settlement Agreement, supra note 152, §§ 3.1–4.4, at 14–22 (describing claim valuation and
payment to qualified claimants).
156 Id. § 11.1, at 41–42; see also Erichson, supra note 16, at 1000–01; Issacharoff, supra note 147, at 218.
157 Vioxx Settlement Agreement, supra note 152, § 11.1, at 41; see also Erichson & Zipursky, supra note
16, at 279.
158 See Vioxx Settlement Agreement, supra note 152, §§ 3.1–4.4, at 14–22.
159 Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 16, at 266.
160 Vioxx Settlement Agreement, supra note 152, § 1.2.8.1, at 5; see also Erichson, supra note 16, at
1001; Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 16, at 280, 283–84 (critiquing the mandatory recommendation
provision).
161 Vioxx Settlement Agreement, supra note 152, § 1.2.8.2, at 5–6; see also Erichson, supra note 16, at
1001; Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 16, at 280–81.
162 Liptak, supra note 14, at A12; see also Vioxx Settlement Agreement, supra note 152, § 1.2.7, at 5
(“The parties agree that a key objective of the Program is that, with respect to any counsel with an Interest in
the claims of any Enrolled Program Claimant, all other Eligible Claimants in which such counsel has an
Interest shall be enrolled in the Program.”).
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lawyer and finding that every other lawyer handling Vioxx claims was
unavailable.”163
While wildly effective—99.79% of eligible claimants enrolled in the
settlement164—the Vioxx settlement was castigated by legal ethicists, who
claimed that the agreement conflicted with the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ ethical
obligations to their clients.165 Among other contentions, the critics argued that
the mandatory recommendation provision “violated the duty to give
independent and loyal advice,”166 while the mandatory withdrawal provision
“violate[d] the bar on practice restrictions, the constraints on terminating the
lawyer-client relationship, and the principle that the decision to accept or reject
a settlement belongs to the client.”167 At least one state bar ethics committee
concluded that the mandatory recommendation and mandatory withdrawal
provisions violated the Rules of Professional Conduct.168
163

Erichson, supra note 16, at 1001.
Id.; Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 16, at 266; see also Minute Entry for December 19, 2008 at 6, In
re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:05-md-01657-EEF-DEK (E.D. La. Dec. 19. 2008), ECF No. 17578,
available at http://www.laed.uscourts.gov/vioxx/Orders/me121908.pdf.
165 See, e.g., Erichson, supra note 16, at 1006–22 (identifying seven problems that arise from
all-or-nothing settlements); see Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 16, at 292 (summarizing the ways in which
the Vioxx settlement “violated well-established principles of legal ethics”).
166 Erichson, supra note 16, at 1003. In support of this argument, Erichson cites Rules 1.7(a)(2) and 2.1 of
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Id. Rule 1.7(a)(2) provides that a lawyer “shall not represent a client
if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of interest exists
if: . . . there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the
lawyer’s responsibilities to another client,” and Rule 2.1 provides that “[i]n representing a client, a lawyer shall
exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice.” See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(2), 2.1 (2013). For a further discussion, see Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 16, at 283–
84, discussing these Rules as well as Rule 1.4 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Rule 1.4 provides
in part that “[a] lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make
informed decisions regarding the representation.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4(b) (2013).
167 Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 16, at 292; see also id. at 284–92 (elaborating upon the ethical
problems posed by the mandatory-withdrawal provision); Erichson, supra note 16, at 1003. In The Trouble
with All-or-Nothing Settlements, Erichson also points to various provisions of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct in support of this proposition, including Rules 1.2(a), 1.8(g), 1.16, and 5.6(b). See Erichson, supra
note 16, at 1003. Rule 1.2(a) provides in part that “[a] lawyer shall abide by a client’s decision whether to
settle a matter.” Rule 1.8(g) provides in part that “[a] lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not
participate in making an aggregate settlement of the claims of or against the clients . . . unless each client gives
informed consent, in a writing signed by the client. The lawyer’s disclosure shall include the existence and
nature of all the claims . . . involved and of the participation of each person in the settlement.” Rule 1.16
prescribes the circumstances in which attorneys must, may and may not withdraw from the representation of a
client. Finally, Rule 5.6(b) provides in part that “[a] lawyer shall not participate in offering or making . . . an
agreement in which a restriction on the lawyer’s right to practice is part of the settlement of a client
controversy.” See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a), 1.8(g), 1.16, 5.6(b) (2013).
168 See Connecticut Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof. Ethics, Informal Op. 08-01 (Feb. 20, 2008), available at
forctlawyers.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/04/08-01-final-signed.pdf (concluding that the agreement deprived
164
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The point here is not to elaborate upon the criticisms of the Vioxx
settlement or to demonstrate why an all-or-nothing settlement on behalf of
future claimants would be unethical. Rather, the point is simply to note that a
Vioxx-type settlement seeking to resolve the claims of exposure-unaware and
contingent future claimants would be impossible. As Professors Erichson and
Zipursky put it, “Obtaining closure without Rule 23 or bankruptcy depends
on . . . knowing who the claimants are.”169 By definition, that knowledge is
unavailable regarding unknown, unaware, and contingent future claimants. Put
differently, a Vioxx-type settlement binds the defendant and the claimants’
attorneys; but individuals who are unaware of their exposure, or of a
relationship they may enter into with an exposed individual in the future, do
not seek legal advice regarding their potential or contingent claims. In the
absence of attorneys retained by these unaware or contingent future claimants,
there would be no attorneys to make the types of promises—to recommend the
settlement to their clients and to withdraw from representing those who decline
it—upon which a Vioxx-type settlement is predicated. Thus, an
“all-or-nothing” Vioxx-type settlement cannot be used to secure a global peace
resolving the claims of exposure-unaware or contingent future claimants.
B. Section 3.17(b)-type Settlements
Nor can a nonclass aggregate settlement of the type proposed in section
3.17(b) of the ALI Principles be deployed to bind unknowing and contingent
future claimants in an effort to secure global peace.170 To understand the
innovation proposed by the ALI in section 3.17(b), recall that a nonclass
aggregate settlement is ordinarily binding only if each claimant agrees in
writing to be bound by its terms after learning what all other claimants will
receive.171 This principle, referred to as the “aggregate-settlement rule,” is
codified in Rule 1.8(g) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,172 a
version of which has been adopted in all fifty states and the District of
Columbia.173 The aggregate-settlement rule is designed to ensure that
clients of the independent advice of their attorneys, interfered with the clients’ decisions whether to settle, and
created conflicts of interest among clients and between the attorney and client).
169 Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 16, at 275.
170 See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, § 3.17(b).
171 See supra note 167.
172 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(g) (2013), quoted supra note 167.
173 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, § 3.17 cmt. A; see also State Adoption of the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/
model_rules_of_professional_conduct/alpha_list_state_adopting_model_rules.html (last visited Dec. 14,
2014).
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claimants have the information they need to assess the adequacy of a proposed
settlement and the fairness of its allocation among multiple claimants.174
While section 3.17(a) of the ALI Principles approves nonclass aggregate
settlements that comply with the aggregate-settlement rule,175 the drafters of
the Principles maintained that compliance with the rule is unduly cumbersome
in cases with many claimants.176 Moreover, they expressed concern that under
the aggregate-settlement rule, individual claimants can “hold out” to secure a
premium for their approval.177 To address these concerns, the drafters included
section 3.17(b) as an alternative to the aggregate-settlement rule for cases
involving large amounts in controversy and many claimants.178 Under
section 3.17(b), “individual claimants may, before the receipt of a proposed
settlement offer, enter into an agreement in writing through shared counsel
allowing each participating claimant to be bound by a substantial-majority vote
of all claimants concerning an aggregate-settlement proposal.”179 In other
words, rather than make individual decisions whether to accept an aggregate
settlement upon learning its terms and the allocation among claimants,
claimants can agree, in advance, to accept a settlement if a “substantial
majority”180 of the claimants accept it; they would waive the rights they

174 See, e.g., Nancy J. Moore, The American Law Institute’s Draft Proposal to Bypass the Aggregate
Settlement Rule: Do Mass Tort Clients Need (or Want) Group Decision Making?, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 395,
406–09 (2008) (describing the role of the aggregate-settlement rule in protecting against inadequate awards
and unfair allocations).
175 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, § 3.17(a) (“[Attorneys] who represent two or more claimants on a
non-class basis may settle the claims of those claimants on an aggregate basis provided that each claimant
gives informed consent in writing. Informed consent requires that each claimant be able to review the
settlements of all other persons subject to the aggregate settlement or the formula by which the settlement will
be divided among all claimants. Further, informed consent requires that the total financial interest of
claimants’ counsel be disclosed to each claimant.”).
176 Id. § 3.17 cmt. c (“[L]arge-scale settlements . . . may have been impeded by the mechanical application
of the aggregate-settlement rule to a substantial multiparty settlement.”); see also Silver & Baker, supra note
18, at 735–36, 763–67 (arguing that “the aggregate settlement rule is a complication that often gets in the way”
of settling mass lawsuits and elaborating on the expense and delay occasioned by the rule in the mass lawsuit
context). But see Moore, supra note 174, at 404 (“[A]ttorneys can—and do—keep their clients informed by
using a combination of group meetings, mass emails, dedicated websites, toll-free numbers, and paralegals.”).
177 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, § 3.17 cmt. b; see also Silver & Baker, supra note 18, at 760 (“[A]
unanimity rule . . . enables a single dissenter to block a group deal.”). But see Moore, supra note 174, at 402–
04, 420 (questioning the ALI Reporters’ premise that individual claimants can veto an aggregate settlement by
holding out and noting that the ALI Reporters “have yet to demonstrate that this problem alone is sufficiently
serious to warrant abrogation of the aggregate settlement rule”).
178 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, § 3.17(c).
179 Id. § 3.17(b) (emphasis added).
180 Id. § 3.17(c).
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otherwise would have under the aggregate-settlement rule.181 In particular,
claimants would waive the right to see the terms of the settlement and the
allocation of the proceeds before agreeing to be bound.182 Recognizing that
settlement agreements may treat different groups of claimants differently,
section 3.17(b) requires “a separate substantial-majority vote of each category
of claimants” if the “settlement significantly distinguishes among different
categories.”183
Under the ALI Principles, section 3.17(b) settlements are binding only if
they are both “substantively fair and reasonable”184 and “fair and reasonable
from a procedural standpoint.”185 Further, in an apparent effort to avoid the
coercive pressure a Vioxx-type settlement exerts, section 3.17(b)(4) requires
attorneys to explain to all claimants that they may insist upon compliance with
the aggregate-settlement rule, and it bars attorneys from withdrawing from
representation solely because a client declines to sign a 3.17(b)-type
agreement.186
But while section 3.17(b) may avoid some of the ethical problems raised by
Vioxx-type settlements,187 it too has been subject to substantial criticism.
Perhaps the most vocal critic has been Professor Nancy Moore, who has
expressed concern that unsophisticated clients may not understand the risks
they would assume by waiving their rights under the aggregate-settlement
rule.188 In Moore’s view, “it can hardly be said that clients who agree to

181 Id. § 3.17 cmt. b (describing subsection (b) as “propos[ing] a contractual-waiver mechanism for
settling aggregate cases”).
182 Id. (noting that “claimants . . . need not know, and typically will not know, the terms of a proposed
settlement” when “subjecting their control of the settlement decision to majority rule”).
183 Id. § 3.17(b).
184 Id. § 3.17(e).
185 Id. § 3.17(d).
186 Id. § 3.17(b)(4); see also id. cmt. b (“This requirement . . . is designed to eliminate any possibility that
a claimant may feel improperly pressured to follow the approach in subsection (b) in order to secure his or her
preferred choice of counsel.”).
187 The Reporters to the Project believed that section 3.17(b)’s advanced consent provision “would have
avoided many of the ethical difficulties in the Vioxx case.” See Discussion of Principles of the Law of
Aggregate Litigation, 85 A.L.I. PROC. 27, 102 (2008) (quoting Professor Samuel Issacharoff); see also
Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 16, at 299 (stating that the “advance-consent approach is transparent and
noncoercive”). But see Morgan, supra note 16, at 751 (concluding that an attorney who represents both clients
who give advanced consent to a 3.17(b)-type settlement and those who prefer the aggregate-settlement rule
will face “conflict of interest issues that the Principles do not effectively address” if “there is not an unlimited
sum available to pay claims”).
188 Moore, supra note 174, at 395 & n.1, 401, 419 (criticizing preliminary drafts of section 3.17(b) and
opining that it is “difficult to imagine that attorneys could provide disclosures at the outset of their
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relinquish their right to reject a proposed settlement, having no idea what their
claim is worth or how it compares to the claims of others, have done so in a
manner that is fully consensual.”189 In Moore’s view, even a supermajority
vote would not protect against the risks of an inadequate settlement, an unfair
allocation, or opportunism on the part of the attorney representing the
claimants because the claims of the supermajority may not be representative of
all claims.190 Nor would such a vote preserve individual clients’ autonomy or
their ability to effectuate their idiosyncratic preferences.191
Professors Howard Erichson and Benjamin Zipursky, too, critique section
3.17(b). Like Moore, they question whether claimants, at the time they sign
retention agreements, can understand the consequences of waiving their
individual right to accept or reject a settlement once it is negotiated.192 Apart
from problems posed by the lack of sophistication of many tort victims,
Erichson and Zipursky question whether the conflicts inherent in an aggregate
settlement can be properly understood before the terms of the settlement are
known.193 They also fear that if advance waivers are permitted, lawyers will
refuse to represent clients who decline to sign them. If the alternative to
consent is to have no lawyer at all, the “consent” of clients to waive their rights
would be inauthentic.194 On a more basic level, Erichson and Zipursky view
the ALI proposal as elevating closure over client consent, while in their view
(and mine), it is “[c]onsent—not closure—[that] determines legitimacy.”195
Courts, too, have expressed deep skepticism of presettlement agreements
that purport to bind groups of clients by settlements approved by less than all
representations that would be adequate for unsophisticated mass tort clients to reasonably understand the
material risks of such waivers”).
189 Nancy J. Moore, The Case Against Changing the Aggregate Settlement Rule in Mass Tort Lawsuits, 41
S. TEX. L. REV. 149, 181 (1999); accord Ass’n of the Bar of the City of New York Comm. on Prof’l & Jud.
Ethics, Formal Op. 2009-6 (2009), available at http://www.nycbar.org/ethics/ethics-opinions-local/2009opinions/792-aggregate-settlements [hereinafter NYC Formal Op. 2009-6] (“In most cases, at the outset of an
engagement, and indeed at any point prior to an actual settlement negotiation, it may be difficult, if not
impossible, for a lawyer to possess, and therefore disclose, enough information to enable the client to
understand the risks of waiving the right to approve a settlement following disclosure of all material facts and
terms. The client therefore would be in no position to intelligently evaluate the waiver of the right.”).
190 Moore, supra note 174, at 409–11 (arguing that the supermajority provision provides insufficient
protection to claimants who are not part of the supermajority).
191 Id. at 414–15.
192 Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 16, at 301–03 (describing the problem of “inauthentic consent”).
193 Id. at 306.
194 Id. at 302–03.
195 Id. at 269; accord Mullenix, supra note 140, at 1928 (“[A]ny resolution of future tort claims must be
based on consent. Constitutional due process requires no less.”).
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of them.196 And an ethics opinion issued by the Committee on Professional and
Judicial Ethics of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York in 2009
rejected section 3.17(b)-type agreements, concluding that the benefits of the
aggregate-settlement rule outweigh any burdens an attorney might face in
securing the necessary consents of all jointly-represented clients.197 It must be
noted, however, that these judicial and ethics committee opinions were
assessing the contractual arrangements before them under existing professional
norms, whereas section 3.17(b) proposes an adjustment of these norms.
Whether one views section 3.17(b) as a sensible innovation to facilitate
nonclass aggregate settlements or an unwise departure from the tried-and-true
aggregate-settlement rule, advance agreements to be bound by a settlement
approved by a supermajority of the claimants cannot be employed with respect
to exposure-unaware or contingent future claimants. There are both logistical
problems and more basic fairness concerns. From a logistical perspective,
unaware or contingent future claimants will have no occasion to retain counsel
to represent them regarding claims they are unaware they have; there will be
no attorney in place to secure the informed consents of future claimants to be
bound by settlements approved by a substantial majority of the claimants.
Thus, the same logistical hurdles that render Vioxx-type settlements
unavailable to resolve the claims of unaware and contingent future claimants
likewise undermine the utility of section 3.17(b) to resolve their claims.198
From a fairness perspective, just as class representatives who are aware of
their exposure and the extent of their injuries cannot adequately represent the
196 See, e.g., Hayes v. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 513 F.2d 892, 894–95 (10th Cir. 1975) (“[H]old[ing] that
the arrangement presented allowing the majority to govern the rights of the minority is violative of the basic
tenets of the attorney-client relationship . . . . [I]t is essential that the final settlement be subject to the client’s
ratification particularly in a non-class action case . . . .”); Abbott v. Kidder Peabody & Co., 42 F. Supp. 2d
1046, 1051 (D. Colo. 1999) (finding that a retainer agreement that allowed a minority of the plaintiffs in the
case to accept or reject a settlement on behalf of all of the plaintiffs was void, unethical, and unenforceable);
In re Hoffmann, 883 So. 2d 425, 433 (La. 2004) (“The requirement of informed consent cannot be avoided by
obtaining client consent in advance to a future decision by the attorney or by a majority of the clients about the
merits of an aggregate settlement.”); Tax Auth., Inc. v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., 898 A.2d 512, 514–15 (N.J.
2006) (finding that New Jersey’s Rule 1.8(g) of the Rules of Professional Conduct “forbids an attorney from
obtaining advance consent from his clients to abide by the majority’s decision about the merits of an aggregate
settlement”).
197 NYC Formal Op. 2009-6, supra note 189 (“[A] client may not waive her individual right to approve
the terms of a proposed aggregate settlement that would, if accepted, bind her along with other parties jointly
represented by the same counsel.”); see also Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 16, at 296 (“Every court and
ethics committee that has considered the issue has concluded that advance consent cannot satisfy the aggregate
settlement rule.”).
198 See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
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interests of future claimants who are unaware of their exposure and who have
not yet manifested any injuries,199 a group of current plaintiffs with known
injuries cannot be expected to consider the interests of those not yet injured in
deciding whether or not to approve the settlement. While the Principles
provide for separate supermajority votes for each category of claimants
contemplated by the settlement, this provision does not ameliorate the fairness
problem. Separate votes are required only “if the settlement significantly
distinguishes among different categories of claimants.”200 But settlements that
allocate funds pursuant to a matrix may not be deemed to create different
categories of claimants and may not differentiate among present and future
claimants.201 And, again, even if they did, there would be no unaware or
contingent future claimants among those voting to look out for the interests of
the group. Thus, the risks of inadequate settlements and unfair allocations that
the aggregate-settlement rule is designed to protect against would be greatly
exacerbated if section 3.17(b)-type agreements were employed to resolve the
claims of unknowing, unaware, and contingent future claimants.
If, as posited in Part III of this Article, unknowing, unaware, and
contingent future claimants cannot be bound by a class action judgment, and if
they cannot be bound by the types of nonclass aggregate settlements described
in this Part, then it appears unlikely that defendants can bind future claimants
before their claims accrue. Thus, the type of global peace that defendants insist
upon will be unattainable in cases involving unknowing, unaware, and
contingent future claimants. The question remaining is whether an alternate
mechanism can be crafted that would protect the constitutional rights of future
claimants and ensure them fair compensation for their injuries while
nevertheless providing the defendant with at least some of the benefits it seeks
from a global peace.202 In other words, if defendants can’t get what they want,
can they get what they need?203

199

See supra Part III.B.
ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, § 3.17(b).
201 Accord Moore, supra note 174, at 410 (“[A]ggregate settlements that are unfairly biased in favor of
some clients do not necessarily identify separate categories of cases.”).
202 See supra Part I.
203 See THE ROLLING STONES, You Can’t Always Get What You Want, on LET IT BLEED (London Records
1969).
200
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V. A HYBRID PUBLIC–PRIVATE CLAIMS RESOLUTION PROCESS
Building on the work of Professors Deborah Hensler204 and Linda
Mullenix,205 I propose a hybrid public–private claims resolution process that
should achieve most, but not all, of the defendants’ goals for global peace
without violating the constitutional rights of future claimants. Like Professor
Mullenix, I propose to sever the resolution of the future claimants’ claims from
those of the current claimants.206 Like Professor Hensler, I propose to provide
future claimants with payments that are comparable to those received by
similarly-situated current claimants under the class action settlement.
Under my proposal, defendants would secure judicial approval of a fair and
reasonable class action settlement of the current claims and then, through an
extrajudicial process, make fair offers on comparable terms to future claimants
as their claims mature, adjusted to take into account the time value of money
and intervening changes in legal doctrine and medical knowledge. Since the
judicially-approved class action settlement would not purport to bind the future
claimants, their constitutional rights would be protected. Even though they
would not be bound by the class action judgment nor obligated to accept the
defendant’s extrajudicial offers, the future claimants would have an incentive
to accept them, rather than sue in tort, because they would be assured
compensation on comparable terms to the judicially-approved class action
settlement, as adjusted, without incurring the costs of litigation.
A. A Fair and Reasonable Class Action Settlement with Current Claimants
First, my model contemplates a fair and reasonable class action settlement
with the current claimants, who would be represented by one or more vigorous
class representatives and able class counsel. The current claimants would
receive notice of the action207 and an opportunity to opt out after disclosure of

204 Hensler, supra note 45, at 589 (proposing class action settlements that bind “both current and future
plaintiffs to the same remedies”).
205 Mullenix, supra note 140, at 1925 (proposing “to privatize the resolution of future claims”); id. at
1925–31 (sketching out a proposal for privatization).
206 Id. at 1925 (proposing to “sever future claims from current claims resolution”). In Mullenix’s view, the
current claimants and their attorneys lack both the incentive and the ability to adequately represent the future
claimants. Id. at 1928; supra Part III.B. Therefore, she maintains, separate treatment of the current and future
claims is needed to “avoid any possibility of conflicts of interest, sell-outs, or taint of collusion,” and to
protect the constitutional rights of the future claimants. Mullenix, supra note 140, at 1925, 1928.
207 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B) (describing the notice required in a (b)(3) class action).
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the terms of the settlement.208 In negotiating the terms of the class action
settlement with the current claimants, the defendant would recognize the
prospect of claims by future claimants and reserve sufficient funds to satisfy
those claims once presented209 but would not seek to resolve the future claims
in the class action settlement.210 The class action settlement of the current
claims would be approved by the district court following a fairness hearing.211
The settlement agreement likely would include a matrix or grid that would
specify a fixed amount or range of amounts that each claimant would recover
depending upon her specific diagnosis and other variables.212 Alternatively, it
could provide for individual meetings between the claimants and a court
appointed Special Master or claims administrator to determine each claimant’s
individual recovery.213 Presumably, the settlement would be negotiated only
after a number of individual trials were conducted, giving the parties a
reasonable idea of the risks they would incur, including the size of likely jury
verdicts, if they declined to settle.
B. Fair Offers on Comparable Terms
While I accept as a central tenet of my proposal Professor Mullenix’s
premise that the future claims should be resolved outside the class action
brought by the current claimants, I reject her proposal that the judge overseeing
the class action should “refer the future claims to ‘future claims vendors’ for a
bidding process” and later assess the “substantive and procedural sufficiency”
of the selected vendor’s bid to assume the defendant’s liability to the future
208 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(4) (granting the court the authority to decline to approve a settlement “unless it
affords a new opportunity to request exclusion to individual class members who had an earlier opportunity to
request exclusion but did not do so”). While the Rules do not require a back-end opt-out right, my proposal
contemplates one to ensure that the underlying settlement with the current claimants is fair and reasonable. See
supra note 127 and accompanying text (discussing back-end opt-out rights); see also, e.g., Cramton, supra
note 9, at 836 (“Providing class members with a back-end opt-out goes a long way toward meeting the due
process requirements of notice and consent . . . .”).
209 See infra notes 228–36 and accompanying text.
210 See infra Parts V.B–C (proposing that in negotiating the class action settlement, the defendant would
retain experts to estimate the number of prospective future claimants and project the size of their claims and
the amount needed to be held back from the class action settlement to satisfy them); see also Mullenix, supra
note 140, at 1925 (suggesting that the prospect of future claims “must be identified early” in the class action
litigation with the current claimants but that such claims should be severed and resolved separately).
211 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2).
212 See, e.g., 2 LAWRENCE G. CETRULO, TOXIC TORTS LITIGATION GUIDE § 16:31 (2013) (describing
matrix settlements); Erichson, supra note 147, at 1789–90 (describing settlements that establish formulae or
matrices).
213 See, e.g., Erichson, supra note 147, at 1790–92 (describing a “claims facility or arbitration process for
assigning values” or individual negotiations with each plaintiff).
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claimants and administer the claims process.214 Just as I question whether
individual representatives or class counsel could adequately represent the
interests of unknowing, unaware, or contingent future claimants,215 I doubt that
a court-appointed guardian or fiduciary, charged with reviewing the vendor’s
bid, could do so. On a more basic level, I question the fairness of implying the
“[c]onsent of future claimants to a fair, court-approved future claims fund”216
and the proposal to absolve the defendant of liability to the future claimants
based upon a process in which the future claimants play no role.217 In lieu of
this court-supervised transfer of the defendant’s liability to a private third-party
vendor, I propose a model that would preserve the future claimants’ legal
claims against the defendant but facilitate their private extrajudicial settlement.
In particular, after judicial approval of the class action settlement with the
current claimants (and exhaustion of any appeals), my model contemplates the
defendant offering future claimants fair settlement terms once their injuries
manifest. To qualify as “fair,” an offer to settle the claim of a future claimant
would have to be on terms comparable to the judicially-approved class action
settlement with the current claimants, as adjusted to take into account medical
and legal developments since the date of the settlement, as well as the time
value of money.
The “comparable terms” portion of my proposal builds on two points made
by Professor Hensler: first, “in many circumstances, current claimants are the
best proxies for future claimants,”218 and second, “[t]he key to allowing such
proxy representation is to prevent current claimants from grabbing all of the
defendants’ assets for themselves, leaving little (or much less) for those who
will file claims in the future.”219 Let me explain the nature and extent of my
agreement on these points and use them as points of departure for the rest of
my proposal.

214

Mullenix, supra note 140, at 1925, 1929.
See supra Part III.B.
216 Mullenix, supra note 140, at 1929.
217 Id. (“[Proposing that] when the defendant has accepted and the court has approved a vendor’s bid, the
defendant would deposit the agreed fund and be relieved of any further obligation to future claimants. Future
claimants could not sue the defendant in the tort system but rather would be referred to the vendor.”).
218 Hensler, supra note 45, at 588; see also id. at 604 (“In negotiating remedies that fit their different
situations today—severely or moderately injured, slightly injured now but at risk of greater injury in the future,
not injured yet but likely to suffer serious injury in the future—current claimants may be the best
representatives of future claimants, who will be similarly diversely positioned.”).
219 Id. at 604.
215
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Professor Hensler is skeptical of representatives appointed specifically to
represent future claimants.220 Instead, she maintains that current claimants will
often be the best representatives for future claimants.221 By negotiating the best
possible terms for themselves, Hensler claims, current claimants (and their
counsel) can capably represent others who already suffered the same type of
injury and those who will suffer the same type of injury in the future.222 The
key, Hensler maintains, is to ensure that the settlement “contain[s] identical
provisions for current and future claimants”223—what she calls the equivalency
requirement.224 Individuals with comparable injuries would receive
comparable recoveries regardless of when their claims matured.
Hensler’s equivalency requirement makes good sense. If the future
claimants had known of their injuries at the time the class action settlement
was approved, they would have been bound by the class action judgment
(unless they had opted out). The named representatives and class counsel
would have represented their interests and the court would have scrutinized the
settlement to ensure that it was “fair, reasonable, and adequate.”225 I adopt
Hensler’s equivalency requirement as an integral part of my proposal.
Hensler’s second point recognizes that the current claimants will receive
their payments soon after approval of the class action settlement while future
claimants will have to wait until their injuries manifest.226 Thus, steps need to
be taken to ensure that the fund is not depleted by current claimants; sufficient
funds have to be set aside or guaranteed to enable the defendant to make
payments on comparable terms to future claimants as their injuries become
known.227

220

See id. at 604–08 (identifying “myriad reasons to believe that future representatives will not be
adequate to the task of representing the interests of future claimants”); see also supra notes 133–46 and
accompanying text.
221 Hensler, supra note 45, at 604, 609.
222 Id. at 604.
223 Id. at 609 (emphasis omitted); see also Cramton, supra note 9, at 831 (“A sound general principle is
that individuals who have similar claims against the same defendants should be treated similarly.”).
224 Hensler, supra note 45, at 609.
225 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2).
226 Hensler, supra note 45, at 604.
227 Id. at 609 (“Settlement funds intended to compensate all future claimants should extend through the
expected latency period of the diseases that are eligible for compensation.”); see also Mullenix, supra note
140, at 1925 (“If a latent injury mass tort involves future claims, that fact must be identified early in the
litigation . . . .”).
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Ensuring sufficient funds to provide compensation on comparable terms to
future claimants may be harder than it seems, even if the claims of the current
and future claimants are resolved simultaneously (as Hensler proposes),
because of the difficulty of estimating the number of future claimants and the
nature and extent of their injuries. Hensler identifies two options to protect
against the risk of underestimation if the claims of the future claimants are
resolved as part of the class action settlement: the defendant can agree to
satisfy all claims on comparable terms without a cap on total compensation—
an option the defendant may reject228—or the defendant can reserve “a
potentially disproportionate amount of funds” for future claimants.229 To
pursue this second option, the defendant could pay current claimants less than
they would have received if the initial estimate of the future claims were
presumed to be correct, with a subsequent pro rata distribution of excess funds
to all claimants after the close of the settlement period.230 This approach might
be impractical if the latency period were very long, as it might be difficult and
expensive to track down claimants entitled to a portion of the undistributed
funds.231 If the estimates regarding the number and size of future claims were
way off and the fund proved inadequate to pay future claimants, Hensler
suggests that they be permitted to “exit to the tort system[,] . . . unless
defendants agree[d] to top up the fund.”232
If, as I propose, the offers to settle with future claimants are made outside
the class action, it will be harder still for the defendant to cap its overall cost,
ensure it has sufficient funds to offer comparable terms to future claimants, or
shift a portion of the risk of underestimation onto the current claimants. To
minimize the risk of underestimation at the time it negotiates the class action
settlement with the current claimants, the defendant should employ
epidemiologists, statisticians, and others to estimate the number of both current
and anticipated future claimants, the range of their expected injuries, the time
frame in which the future claimants’ injuries will manifest, and the cost of

228 An uncapped settlement would not provide defendants with the type of global peace they seek. See
supra Part I.
229 Hensler, supra note 45, at 610.
230 Id.
231 Id. As an alternative, Hensler suggests that unclaimed funds could be “contributed to a suitable
charity.” Id. at 610–11. For a critical analysis of such cy pres distributions, see, e.g., Rhonda Wasserman, Cy
Pres in Class Action Settlements, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2413951.
232 Hensler, supra note 45, at 611.
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compensating them on comparable terms.233 The defendant should hold back
sufficient monies from the class action settlement fund to offer comparable
terms to future plaintiffs as their injuries manifest.
Professor Mullenix suggests that some entity other than the claimants or
those retained to act on their behalf “should be responsible for determining the
number of future claimants. If we have learned anything from three decades of
mass tort litigation, it is that the actors involved in latent injury mass torts have
proven to be notoriously bad at estimating the universe of future claimants.”234
I agree that when the parties seek to resolve the claims of both the current and
future claimants simultaneously within the context of a single class action
settlement, the defendant’s incentive will be to minimize the estimate of the
number and size of future claims, secure experts to support the low estimate,
convince the court to approve the settlement, and cap its overall liability.235
But if, as I propose, the defendant were to remain ultimately liable to the
prospective future claimants and could not limit or cap that liability through
the class action settlement, the defendant should be genuinely committed to
reserving adequate funds to offer comparable terms to the future claimants. If it
retained competent, objective experts charged with making accurate
predictions, it is not clear why those experts would be less able to do so than
other experts. The key would be to ensure that the experts were not only
competent and objective but convinced of the primacy of reserving sufficient
funds for future claimants.236
There are two important points on which I disagree with Professor Hensler.
The first is whether future claimants can be part of the represented class and
bound by the class action judgment, as Hensler posits.237 For reasons
elaborated upon above, I believe they cannot be bound;238 I will not belabor
that point here.
233 Id. (“Estimates of the size of the fund necessary to compensate all claimants should factor in the
probability distribution of different numbers of claimants with claims of different magnitudes coming forward
over time.”).
234 Mullenix, supra note 140, at 1925.
235 Id. at 1926 (“The major motivation for providing a reasonably plausible estimate of future claims is to
induce the court’s approval of the settlement. However, hardly anyone involved in a mass tort settlement
(other than an objector or a guardian ad litem for future claimants) has a great incentive to challenge the
estimate. After the court approves a settlement, if the money runs out, neither the parties nor the court
especially cares about the future claimants.” (footnote omitted)).
236 See id. (“[A]ny system for dealing with future claims must include some mechanism for inducing the
most accurate estimate of the universe of future claimants.”).
237 Hensler, supra note 45, at 596–610.
238 See supra Part III.
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The second point of disagreement is whether the terms of the settlement (to
be extended to future claimants under the equivalency requirement) should be
adjusted to take into account significant intervening changes in medicine and
law. While we agree on the need to protect against the risk of inflation,239
Professor Hensler maintains that “as a normative matter, it is not clear why
[future] claimants should receive the benefit of [changes in scientific evidence
or legal doctrine] if current claimants with the same disease symptoms are
denied these benefits.”240 For reasons I will explain in the next subpart, I
believe the offers to future claimants should be adjusted to take these
intervening changes into account.
C. Adjustments to Account for Significant Changes in Medicine and Law and
the Time Value of Money
Before turning to this point of disagreement, let me first emphasize our
agreement regarding the need to adjust payouts to future claimants to account
for inflation. It should go without saying that a payment deemed “fair,
reasonable, and adequate”241 today will not be adequate ten years from now
when some future claimants may first be entitled to compensation from the
defendant due to the effects of inflation.242 Yet the Amchem settlement, which
purported to bind future claimants, neglected to account for inflation243—one
of many clues that the representation provided by the named plaintiffs and
class counsel in that case was inadequate.244 Under my proposal, the offers that
the defendant would make to future claimants to settle on comparable terms
would need to be adjusted to account for the time value of money.
In my view, the terms of the offers made to future claimants should also be
adjusted to take into account significant changes in medical knowledge or legal
doctrine. Let me begin with two examples, both from the Agent Orange
litigation, before elaborating upon my position. Veterans who had been
239 Hensler, supra note 45, at 611 (“[F]und designers must grapple with estimating inflation and discount
rates and determine how fast the fund needs to accrue, among other knotty economic issues.”); accord
Mullenix, supra note 140, at 1929 (suggesting that payments to future claimants should be “based on current
values for like claims resolved in the tort system, and adjusted for the time value of money (or inflation or
escalation)”).
240 Hensler, supra note 45, at 610.
241 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2).
242 See, e.g., Aswath Damodaran, A Primer on the Time Value of Money, DAMODARAN ONLINE,
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/PVPrimer/pvprimer.htm (last visited Dec. 14, 2014).
243 Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 606, 627 (1997).
244 Id. at 625–28 (analyzing the adequacy of representation).
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exposed to the defoliant Agent Orange in Vietnam and their family members
filed suits against manufacturers of the product and the federal government,
claiming that the veterans’ exposure to the product had caused a host of
medical problems, including birth defects in their children.245 Serious doubts
abounded regarding causation: the trial court concluded that “there is as yet no
epidemiological evidence that paternal veteran exposure to Agent Orange
causes birth defects or miscarriages,”246 and the Second Circuit stated that “the
clear weight of scientific evidence casts grave doubt on the capacity of Agent
Orange to injure human beings.”247 Nevertheless, in declining to certify a class
action against the federal government, the district court noted:
[S]tudies are continuing. Certifying a class would give res judicata
effect to this court’s granting of summary judgment in favor of the
government. It would be unfair to preclude children with birth
defects—both born and unborn—from someday using studies that
may possibly establish the validity of their claims against the
government.248

Likewise, in ruling on the claims of individual children, the district court in
Agent Orange declined to grant the government’s motion for summary
judgment, which had argued that the plaintiffs lacked proof of causation.249
Instead, the district court dismissed the children’s claims without prejudice,
thereby preserving their right to sue “if evidence subsequently shows that they
have a valid claim against the government.”250 The court thought it “both
reasonable and fair” to preserve the claims of children—both born and
unborn—in case medical, epidemiological, or other scientific evidence
regarding causation later developed that would strengthen them.251
245

Agent Orange I, 818 F.2d 145, 148–49 (2d Cir. 1987) (providing an overview of the claims).
In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 603 F. Supp. 239, 246 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
247 Agent Orange I, 818 F.2d at 149.
248 In re Agent Orange, 603 F. Supp. at 242 (emphasis added).
249 Id. at 247–48.
250 Id. at 247.
251 Id.; see also Agent Orange I, 818 F.2d at 160 (discussing the district judge’s refusal to certify a class
action against the government and noting his concern “that class certification would unfairly preclude children
with birth defects from bringing suit were future scientific studies to establish the validity of their claims
against the government”).
Ordinarily, the statute of limitations on a child’s claim is tolled until the child reaches the age of
majority. See 1 DONALD T. KRAMER, LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN § 11:3, at 851–52 (rev. 2d ed. 2005). Thus,
a decision excluding unknowing, exposure-unaware, or unborn children from a class action, or dismissing their
claims without prejudice, would ordinarily give them years, or even decades, in which to await medical
research that might strengthen their claims. But tort claims against the federal government are governed by a
two-year statute of limitations, see 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (2012), which is not tolled during a child’s minority.
See, e.g., Fernandez v. United States, 673 F.2d 269, 271 (9th Cir. 1982); 1 KRAMER, supra, § 11:6, at 868.
246
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The second example, also drawn from the Agent Orange litigation,
illustrates the potential role that a change in the law can play in assessing the
strength of future plaintiffs’ claims. The private defendants in the case—the
manufacturers of Agent Orange, who sold the product to the federal
government for use in the Vietnam War—invoked the military (or
government) contractor defense, which shields from liability manufacturers
who supply products to the government pursuant to validly authorized
government contracts.252 In affirming the district court’s approval of the class
action settlement, the Second Circuit expressed its view that the military
contractor defense posed an “impossible” hurdle that undermined the
plaintiffs’ claims against the manufacturers.253 In later reviewing a collateral
attack by veterans whose injuries had not been known at the time the
settlement was approved but which manifested before the payout period
expired,254 the Second Circuit considered the plaintiffs’ argument that an
intervening change in Supreme Court precedent had altered the scope of the
military contractor defense, thereby strengthening their claims:
[D]espite some intervening changes in the law, serious obstacles to
recovery remain. Thus, although the scope of the government
contract defense has been somewhat limited by the Supreme Court’s
decision in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., under proper
circumstances the defense is still available to government contractors.
There is more than a mere possibility that such circumstances exist in
the instant case.255

Following further analysis of the facts of the case, which distinguished it from
Boyle, the court concluded that “the availability of the government contract
defense might not be a foregone conclusion, [but] there is a reasonable

Nevertheless, the Agent Orange decision declining to certify a class and dismissing the children’s claims
without prejudice instead gave at least the unborn children and the infants a period of time (i.e., the time
remaining under the statute of limitations) in which to see if stronger proof regarding causation developed.
252 See, e.g., Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18, 20–21 (1940) (“[I]f this authority to carry
out the project was validly conferred, that is, if what was done was within the constitutional power of
Congress, there is no liability on the part of the contractor for executing its will.”); In re Agent Orange Prod.
Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 792, 796–97 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (stating that, as applied to the Agent Orange
litigation, the government contract defense would “avoid manufacturer liability on the ground that the
circumstances surrounding Agent Orange’s manufacture and use were controlled and dictated by the United
Sates government acting in a capacity in which the government is protected from liability” and denying the
defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the defense because questions of fact existed).
253 Agent Orange I, 818 F.2d at 173.
254 See supra notes 86, 112–22 and accompanying text.
255 Agent Orange II, 996 F.2d 1425, 1436 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing, inter alia, Boyle v. United Techs. Corp.,
487 U.S. 500, 512 (1988)).
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probability that it would apply, barring any recovery by the plaintiffs.”256 In
light of this legal hurdle and other significant problems with the plaintiffs’
case, the court ultimately rejected the plaintiffs’ collateral attack, finding that
the representation afforded them in the class action had been “more than
adequate.”257 What is important to note here is that the Second Circuit credited
the possibility that a significant change in the legal landscape could have
altered the conclusion that the future claimants had been adequately
represented by the current claimants.
These examples support my view that medical, epidemiological, and
scientific discoveries as well as changes in legal doctrine may require
adjustments to the terms of the offers to be made to future claimants under my
proposal. Ordinarily plaintiffs sue only after they learn of the nature and extent
of their injuries. Their claims are then adjudicated or settled in light of current
medical and legal understandings. It is reasonable, then, if not ineluctable, to
assess the fairness of a settlement binding current claimants against the
backdrop of current medical knowledge and legal precedent. But since
unknowing future claimants would not ordinarily sue before learning the
nature and extent of their injuries, it would not make sense to determine their
recoveries against the backdrop of medical knowledge and legal precedent that
existed years, if not decades, before their injuries became known. Thus, my
proposal contemplates offers by the defendant to future claimants, as their
injuries become known, that are equivalent to the offers made to current
claimants in the class action settlement, adjusted for inflation and for changes
in medical knowledge and legal doctrine.
An extrajudicial system of fair offers on comparable terms to future
claimants, adjusted as recommended, will be practicable only if the
adjustments are made at relatively infrequent intervals. If the defendant were to
provide notice of its offers on an annual or semiannual basis, as recommended
in Part V.D below, it would not be too difficult to adjust the amounts offered
by the inflation rate each time a notice were issued. While it would be more
difficult to determine whether medical or legal developments since the date of
the class action settlement (or the most recent offer to future claimants)
required an adjustment in the amount of the offers (and if so, by what amount),
it would be in the defendant’s interest to undertake the scientific and legal
research needed to determine if an adjustment were required. After all, future
256
257

Id.
Id. at 1437.
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claimants would neither be bound by the class action judgment nor required to
accept the offers on comparable terms. If the future claimants could do
significantly better suing the defendant in tort at the time their injuries
manifested (because of changes in the medical or legal landscape), they would
sue. If the defendant wished to resolve all the future claimants’ claims against
it without individual lawsuits, as we posited at the outset,258 then its periodic
offers would have to take these developments into account. To ensure that the
adjustments made are fair (and will garner acceptance by future claimants), the
defendant should confer and negotiate with several plaintiffs’ attorneys that
specialize in this type of litigation when it revises the size of the offers in light
of these changes in legal doctrine and medical knowledge.259 The cost of an
annual or semiannual review of the scientific literature and recent judicial
decisions, and the associated cost of recalibrating the size of the offers, with
feedback from plaintiffs’ counsel, would presumably be far less than the cost
of defending a multitude of fresh lawsuits.
In dismissing the need to adjust future claimants’ recoveries in light of
changes in medical knowledge and legal precedent, Professor Hensler notes the
possibility that changes in medicine or law “might disfavor future claimants, in
which case the settlement negotiated today will provide better remedies than
would be available to them in the future.”260 I concede this possibility and the
logic of permitting defendants to make downward adjustments: just as future
plaintiffs would be entitled to an upward adjustment to account for changes in
science or law that would strengthen their claims, defendants would have
reason to make downward adjustments if the changes in medical knowledge or
legal precedent significantly undercut the strength of the future plaintiffs’
claims. Since the future plaintiffs would be under no obligation to accept the
offers, however, the defendant would have reason to consult with plaintiffs’
attorneys on the downward adjustments and resist the temptation to make
unreasonable adjustments, or the plaintiffs would reject them and sue in tort.
This final point about reducing the size of the offers to take into account
changes in medicine or law provides an opportunity to address a potential
criticism of my proposal. One might argue that the proposal would permit a
type of one-way intervention reminiscent of the pre-1966 version of
258

See supra Part I.
See infra notes 264–65 and accompanying text.
260 Hensler, supra note 45, at 610; see also id. at 610 n.111 (citing the silicone gel implant litigation as an
example of a case in which the plaintiffs’ evidence of causation became weaker as new studies were
completed).
259
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Rule 23261: if future plaintiffs like the fair offers on comparable terms derived
from the class action settlement, as adjusted, they will accept them and “take
advantage” of the settlement; if they do not like the terms (and the size of the
adjustments), they will reject the offers and sue in tort. But the future
plaintiffs’ freedom to reject a settlement offer differs significantly from the
ability of absent class members pre-1966 to avoid the binding effect of a
judgment. After all, settlements, by their very nature, contemplate the consent
of both parties.262 The plaintiff is bound only if she accepts the defendant’s
offer, and the defendant is bound only if its (voluntary) offer is accepted by the
plaintiff. The one-way intervention under the pre-1966 Rule 23, on the other
hand, allowed absent claimants to avoid judgments that were rendered against
the class while binding the defendant by judgments that favored the class. This
type of one-way intervention was unfair because the plaintiffs’ freedom to
reject the judgment was not shared by the defendant. Here, there does not seem
to be any unfairness in allowing future claimants to reject settlement offers
they deem inadequate.
D. Notice to Future Claimants of the Offer to Settle on Comparable Terms
To notify future claimants of its offer to settle on comparable terms (as
adjusted), the defendant should initially notify law firms specializing in the
type of case presented—firms that presumably represented class members in
the class action or opt-out plaintiffs in independent actions—supplemented by
notice by publication. The defendant would have the option of following up
directly with individual future claimants, subject to the strictures of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct,263 in the event the law firms provided the
defendant with the individuals’ contact information.

261 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(3) advisory committee’s note (1966) (using the phrase “one-way
intervention” to refer to the possibility, under the pre-1966 version of the rule, that “class members might be
permitted to intervene after a decision on the merits favorable to their interests, in order to secure the benefits
of the decision for themselves, although they would presumably be unaffected by an unfavorable decision”).
262 See, e.g., Cramton, supra note 9, at 835 (“A settlement cannot bind a tort claimant unless that person
has consented to it.”); Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 16, at 312–18 (describing the importance of consent in
settling tort claims, especially positive-value claims).
263 While Model Rule 4.2 would bar defendant’s counsel from communicating directly with future
claimants known to be represented by counsel (without such counsel’s consent), see MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2013), the Rule would not bar the defendant itself from communicating with the claimants.
Alternatively, since the defendant would presumably obtain the names of and contact information for future
claimants from the claimants’ attorneys, the defendant could request permission from such attorneys for
defendant’s counsel to transmit the settlement offers to the claimants directly.
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Providing initial notice to attorneys specializing in the type of claim
presented in the class action would be a sensible way to reach future claimants
as such attorneys would have relevant experience, and future claimants might
well approach them as their claims matured if the attorneys were known in
their respective communities for handling that type of case.264 Such attorneys
might also engage in advertising to reach prospective future claimants as they
learned of their exposure and as their injuries manifested.265 The defendant
should be able to send notice via email to attorneys with whom it dealt
regarding current claimants, thereby reducing the cost of providing notice.
Attorneys would be obligated to relay notice of the offers to their clients and
could secure permission from them to provide client contact information to the
defendant.
Notice to plaintiffs’ attorneys specializing in this type of case would be
supplemented by notice by publication. Internet notice, including notice on
Facebook, Twitter, and other social media platforms, would be relatively
inexpensive. Notice by publication in national newspapers, and on television
and radio, would be far more expensive so its use would have to be judicious.
Likewise, if law firms provided contact information for their clients or if the
defendant knew the identities and whereabouts of the future claimants, it could
provide direct notice via email at a reasonable cost; notice by first-class mail
would be more costly but advisable.
Since the goal would be to ensure that, as their injuries manifest, future
claimants receive notice of the defendant’s settlement offer—either through
counsel, the media or directly—the defendant should reissue notice on a
periodic basis. The frequency of the notice would be determined, in part, by
the length of the latency period or the time period in which future claimants
would be expected to learn of their injuries. With a very lengthy latency
period, like the decades-long period for asbestos-related disease,266 notice
should be provided regularly to law firms and through the media, perhaps once
a year. With a shorter latency or other time period—such as the two-year
window during which those with manufactured hip socket implants would

264

See, e.g., Hensler, supra note 45, at 588 (“[M]ost mass tort claimants will be represented by attorneys
who specialize in litigating on behalf of large groups of plaintiffs . . . .”).
265 Id. at 598 (“Mass tort plaintiffs are solicited through mass advertising, increasingly via the Internet, by
individual law firms, groups of firms that have affiliated with each other for the purpose of soliciting plaintiffs,
and legal marketing services that identify potential plaintiffs and refer them to law firms for a fee.”).
266 See supra notes 37, 49.
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likely learn if their implants would fail267—notice should be provided more
frequently, perhaps twice a year. Given the significant cost of notice in
national newspapers, and on television and radio, such notice might be
provided less frequently than notice by email and internet. Likewise, while
notice by first-class mail has long been viewed as a preferred means of
providing individual notice,268 it would not make sense to use it on a regular
basis to reach future claimants whose injuries might not manifest for years to
come, especially given its relatively high cost. Notice by first-class mail or
email to individuals who seek legal counsel regarding their illness, on the other
hand, would be well worth the cost.
The defendant would have a real incentive to provide effective notice of its
offer to future claimants because it would prefer to settle with them on
comparable terms rather than face fresh litigation. But if notice did not reach
all future claimants, no constitutional problem would arise because no claimant
would be bound by the proposed settlement offer in the absence of actual
consent. Thus, the constitutional problems that bedevil class actions with
future members would not complicate the hybrid public–private claims
resolution process proposed here.
E. Can Defendants Get What They Need?: The 9/11 Victim Compensation
Fund Example
My proposal would not give defendants what they want—global peace—
because future claimants would neither be bound by the class action judgment
nor obligated to accept the fair offers on comparable terms, as adjusted, that
defendants would make. Thus, my proposal would not cap defendants’ total
exposure. The question is whether the proposal nevertheless would provide
defendants with enough of what they need—a likely end to the steady stream
of new claims, a significant reduction in transaction costs, and freedom from
the distractions of litigation269—while preserving future claimants’
constitutional rights and their freedom to accept or reject the settlement offers
once they know the nature and extent of their injuries. To answer this question,
one must assess the likelihood that future plaintiffs with strong claims would
be inclined to accept extrajudicial settlement offers on comparable terms. If all
the claimants with weak claims were to accept the offers while all or most of
267

See supra note 72.
See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B); Eisen v. Carlisle, 417 U.S. 156, 174–75 (1974); Mullane v. Cent.
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 318 (1950).
269 See supra Part I.
268
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the claimants with strong claims were to reject them and sue in tort, obviously
defendants would not get what they need.
The 9/11 victim compensation fund, created by Congress to compensate the
families of the deceased victims and the survivors of the infamous terrorist acts
of September 11, 2001,270 is one of the best-known and most successful
extrajudicial settlements (at least if success is measured in terms of
participation rate). Some ninety-seven percent of the eligible families made
claims against the fund rather than sue in tort.271 While there certainly are
important differences between a government-funded settlement like the 9/11
victim compensation fund and the defendant-funded claims resolution process
contemplated here,272 the 9/11 fund provides a useful benchmark both because
it achieved such a high participation rate and because the report of the Special
Master, Kenneth Feinberg, identified five principal factors that contributed to
its success:
First, the alternative of litigation presented both uncertainty and
delay. Second, the Fund took extraordinary steps to assure that
families could obtain detailed information about their likely recovery
from the Fund. Third, the Fund took a proactive approach—
personally contacting each claimant, ensuring that claimants were
able to obtain and present the best information in support of the
claim; assisting claimants to obtain helpful information; explaining to
claimants information that would assist the Fund in maximizing the
computation of economic loss and resolving uncertainties in favor of
the claimant. Fourth, the Fund offered in-person informal meetings
along with hearings so that claimants could “have their day in court”
and explain the magnitude of their loss and their views about the way
in which the Fund should treat their particular situation. Fifth, the

270 See Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, tit. IV, 115 Stat. 230,
237–41 (2001).
271 1 KENNETH R. FEINBERG, FINAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER FOR THE SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM
COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001, 1 (2004) (“[T]he Fund was an unqualified success: 97% of the families of
deceased victims who might otherwise have pursued lawsuits for years have received compensation through
the Fund.”).
272 Among the most obvious are, first, the difference between the vast, virtually limitless resources
available to the federal government to settle the claims, id. at 4; § 406(b), 115 Stat. at 240, and the more
limited resources available to any private company; second, the 9/11 fund was the product of federal
legislation, whereas the vast majority of mass tort cases are not governed by special legislation; and third, the
federal legislation barred consideration of negligence or liability and the award of punitive damages,
§ 405(b)(2), (5), 115 Stat. at 238–39, whereas fault is usually a predicate to recovery in mass tort litigation and
punitive damages are available where warranted.
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Fund offered certainty without significant delay, allowing families
the option of a type of “closure.”273

With these factors in mind, we can attempt to assess the efficacy of the
public–private hybrid system proposed here and the likelihood that future
claimants with strong claims would accept the offers. First, just as surviving
family members who opted out of the 9/11 victim compensation fund faced the
prospect of uncertain and protracted litigation, so too would prospective future
claimants face the vagaries and expense of litigation if they were to reject the
fair offers on comparable terms proposed here.
Second, according to Feinberg, the transparency of the 9/11 compensation
fund and its methodology enabled the families of victims to determine in
advance their likely recoveries. The ability of families to make such
predictions was very important because the filing of a claim with the 9/11
compensation fund constituted a waiver of the right to sue.274 In other words,
families had to decide whether to seek recovery from the fund or sue without a
firm settlement offer in hand. To enable families to predict the likely amounts
of their recoveries, fund administrators employed objective factors, such as a
decedent’s age, number of dependents, and earnings history to determine
economic loss, subject to adjustments for extraordinary circumstances,275 and
made awards for pain and suffering pursuant to a simple formula.276 Because it
would have been much more difficult to predict the outcome of a lawsuit and
to estimate the size of any award a lawsuit might produce, the transparency of
the 9/11 compensation fund and its methodology encouraged participation in
the settlement.
Under my proposal, if the defendant revealed the grid or matrix it
employed in the class action settlement and the formula for or extent of the
adjustments to be made (for inflation, or changes in either medical knowledge
or legal precedent), the hybrid system proposed here would be equally
transparent. Indeed, it would be more transparent because future claimants
273 1 FEINBERG, supra note 271, at 1; cf. Linda S. Mullenix, Designing Compensatory Funds: In Search of
First Principles, 3 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 1), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2466301 (scrutinizing the goals of funds like the 9/11 fund
and suggesting “that certain types of mass disaster events ought not to be resolved through fund auspices at
all”).
274 § 405(c)(3)(B)(i), 115 Stat. at 239–40 (“Upon the submission of a claim[,] . . . the claimant waives the
right to file a civil action . . . in any Federal or State court for damages sustained as a result of the
terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001.”).
275 1 FEINBERG, supra note 271, at 7–8.
276 Id. at 9.
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could wait to receive actual offers from the defendant before deciding whether
to accept the offer or reject it and sue in tort. The transparency of the process,
the certainty of the settlement offer, and the relative speed of the process
should encourage future claimants to forego litigation and accept the
settlement offers.
Third, the 9/11 compensation fund staff was proactive and supportive. Staff
members reached out personally to the families of the victims and helped them
secure the information they needed to make the strongest cases possible,
resolving doubts in favor of the families. The system of notice proposed in
Part V.D above also contemplates proactive contact with law firms likely to
represent future claimants as their injuries manifest as well as proactive notice
by publication. The 9/11 experience suggests that defendants seeking very high
participation rates should also secure contact information for individual
claimants from the law firms (or otherwise) and reach out to the future
claimants personally.277
Even if private defendants were proactive and creative in reaching out to
prospective future claimants, one may question whether they would be as
solicitous or helpful as the 9/11 compensation fund staff members were, or as
willing to resolve uncertainties in favor of the claimants. Several differences
between the two scenarios provide reason for doubt. While the 9/11 victim
compensation fund was uncapped,278 and staff members could resolve doubts
in favor of the families without fear of bankrupting the government, private
defendants cannot match the government’s resources, and one of their principal
goals is to cap their overall liability.279 Therefore, financial constraints could
limit the extent of the defendant’s outreach, the solicitude of the claims
administration staff, and the generosity of the offers. All of these factors, in
turn, could reduce the participation rate. Differences in the number of
claimants, too, could make it hard for private defendants to match the
solicitude, patience, and individual attention provided to the families by the
9/11 fund staff. It is one thing to provide such personal attention to thousands
of individuals; it is another to do so regarding hundreds of thousands or even
millions of prospective claimants. Regardless of the reasons, if the
administrators handling the claims resolution process contemplated here were
277

See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
See supra note 272; see also § 406(b), 115 Stat. at 240 (“This title constitutes budget authority in
advance of appropriations Acts and represents the obligation of the Federal Government to provide for the
payment of amounts for compensation under this title.”).
279 See supra notes 18–20 and accompanying text.
278
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considerably less supportive than the 9/11 staff, the participation rate could
suffer.
Fourth, Feinberg maintained that his staff offered the families the
opportunity to meet with the decisionmakers in informal meetings and more
formal hearings, thereby affording family members something akin to “their
day in court.”280 The families could present the strongest case possible to the
decisionmakers and experience the catharsis of describing, in person, “the
magnitude of their loss.”281 In Feinberg’s words, “the Fund empowered
claimants.”282 He viewed this level of access, personal participation and
investment in the process by the families as central to the 9/11 fund’s
success.283
There are at least two reasons why private defendants might be less
inclined to offer future claimants access to the decisionmakers and the
opportunity to make their strongest case in person. First, if the point of such
personal meetings is to enable the claimant to influence the decisionmaker to
make more generous awards, and if private defendants are trying to limit their
overall liability, they may not be inclined to provide such access. Second, even
apart from the potential impact that such meetings could have on the size of
claimants’ awards, private defendants may be leery of the added cost of
providing personal meetings. On the other hand, if the mere opportunity to tell
their story gives claimants an opportunity for catharsis and if their participation
increases their investment in the process, they might be more likely to accept
the offers (regardless of whether they actually influence the
decisionmakers).284 Thus, the cost–benefit analysis of deciding whether to
permit claimants to meet with the decisionmakers could be complex.

280

1 FEINBERG, supra note 271, at 1 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
282 Id. at 2.
283 Id. (“Claimants had a personal stake and involvement in the process. Had the Fund opted to curtail
access or failed to offer explanations of the manner in which the Fund would treat each individual’s situation,
some portion of claimants would likely have been sufficiently uncomfortable or uncertain to commit to the
Fund.”).
284 See, e.g., Stephen McG. Bundy, The Policy in Favor of Settlement in an Adversary System, 44
HASTINGS L.J. 1, 44 (1992) (“When a remedy results from reasoned, voluntary consent, the parties may view
the outcome as more valid and legitimate than one imposed after adjudication and enforced by the sheriff.”);
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the Mandatory Settlement
Conference, 33 UCLA L. REV. 485, 487 (1985) (“Solutions to disputes can be tailored to the parties’
polycentric needs and can achieve greater party satisfaction and enforcement reliability . . . .” (footnotes
omitted)).
281

WASSERMAN GALLEYSPROOFS2

588

12/23/2014 12:14 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:531

Feinberg’s final factor emphasized the certainty and speed of the 9/11
victim compensation fund relative to litigation. The fair offers on comparable
terms proposed here should offer claimants a faster and more certain recovery
than litigation. Like the 9/11 families, the future claimants likely would prefer
a certain amount of cash in hand today to an uncertain amount, if any, years in
the future. Moreover, if the future claimants’ attorneys could be convinced to
accept less than their standard percentage of the recovery in attorneys’ fees
(given their limited role in the process), future claimants would benefit even
more. In light of the speed, certainty and reduced cost of a settlement relative
to litigation, prospective future claimants might be receptive to fair settlement
offers on comparable terms.
CONCLUSION
Unknowing, exposure-unaware, and contingent future claimants cannot be
bound by class action judgments or settlements because they cannot be notified
of the litigation and cannot be adequately represented. Conflicts of interest
between present and future claimants are likely to arise that even subclasses
with separate representation cannot cure. Class counsel will not be able to
identify members of the subclasses of exposure-unaware and contingent future
claimants to serve as representatives, and even if nonclass members could be
appointed to represent the subclasses, those persons would not be able to
anticipate changes in medical knowledge and legal precedent that could occur
before the future claimants’ injuries manifested. In the absence of adequate
representation, future class members cannot be bound.
Nor can the nonclass aggregate settlement alternatives used in the Vioxx
litigation or proposed in the ALI Principles be deployed to resolve the claims
of exposure-unaware or contingent future claimants. Vioxx-type all-or-nothing
settlements cannot be used because they depend upon the consent of claimants’
attorneys; but neither exposure-unaware nor contingent future claimants will
have occasion to consult counsel until their injuries manifest or their claims
mature. The ALI’s advanced consent proposal, too, depends upon attorneys, in
this case to secure the claimants’ advanced consents to be bound by a
settlement approved by a substantial majority. For the reasons outlined above,
unaware and contingent future claimants will not have consulted attorneys by
the time the consents are solicited. Even if these logistical hurdles could
somehow be overcome, the risks of inadequate settlements and unfair
allocations would remain because those voting and deciding the fate of all
claimants would not include (or look out for) the unknowing.
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In lieu of class actions or nonclass aggregate settlements, the hybrid
public–private mechanism proposed here contemplates judicial approval of a
class action settlement with the current claimants, followed by fair offers to
future claimants, as their injuries manifest, through an extrajudicial claims
resolution process. To be fair, the offers would have to be made on terms
comparable to those provided to the current claimants in the class action
settlement, adjusted to take into account the time value of money and
significant intervening changes in legal precedent or medical knowledge.
The ultimate question is whether such a hybrid system would secure
enough “global peace” to meet the defendant’s needs while at the same time
protecting the constitutional rights of future claimants and affording them fair
compensation. The proposal would not formally cap the defendant’s liability
because the class action settlement would not bind the future claimants, and
they would be free to reject the offers on comparable terms and sue
independently. But the defendant would have a strong incentive, at the time it
negotiated the class action settlement with the current claimants, to accurately
estimate the number of prospective future claimants; to negotiate terms that it
could afford to offer to current and future claimants alike; and to reach out to
future claimants, as their claims mature, in a proactive, transparent, and
receptive manner. If most of the future claimants with strong claims accepted
the offers, there would be little follow-up litigation, and the system would
provide the defendant with a de facto cap.
In addition, the proposed system should reduce the defendant’s attorneys’
fees and other costs by minimizing litigation with future claimants. While the
defendant would incur the costs of providing notice, performing the research
needed to adjust the offers periodically, and hiring a plan administrator to run
the program, its attorneys’ fees, which make up the vast majority of litigation
costs, would be greatly reduced. If most of the future claimants accepted the
offers, the proposed scheme would allow the defendant to reassure its
shareholders and others in the market and refocus on core business functions.
If the future claimants’ principal goal were to secure fair compensation for
their injuries, they would have an incentive to accept the offers as their claims
mature since they would receive as much as the class action plaintiffs had, and
even more if intervening changes in law or medical knowledge enhanced the
strength of their claims. The future claimants would be able to avoid uncertain
and protracted litigation by accepting the offers, and they might be able to
significantly reduce their costs if they could convince their counsel to reduce

WASSERMAN GALLEYSPROOFS2

590

12/23/2014 12:14 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:531

their fees given the limited role such counsel would play in guiding claimants
through this extrajudicial process. Of course, if future claimants sought more
than fair compensation—if they wanted a court to articulate the law or
announce a change in the law, or if they sought a public apology from the
defendant285—this process might not serve their needs and they might reject
the fair offers on comparable terms.
Depending upon the goals of the future claimants, the fairness of the offers
extended to them, and the degree of transparency, solicitude, and personal
participation afforded, the hybrid claims resolution process proposed here
might be able to achieve something approximating global peace.

285 See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984) (rejecting “that
settlement as a generic practice is preferable to judgment or should be institutionalized on a wholesale and
indiscriminate basis” and viewing settlement as “the civil analogue of plea bargaining: Consent is often
coerced; the bargain may be struck by someone without authority; the absence of a trial and judgment renders
subsequent judicial involvement troublesome; and although dockets are trimmed, justice may not be done”).

